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Introduction: Economic Outlook 
It's difficult to determine how much of the recent weakness in the economy is due to the 
possible war and how much is due simply to general economic sluggishness. Even 
without the situation developing in Iraq, economic growth would likely still be moderate, 
well below potential, and insufficient to generate much job growth. The more immediate 
prospect of war has resulted in more pronounced weakness. After Iraq, the pieces are in 
place for better economic growth, but following the initial post-war boost, the pace of 
growth may remain disappointing. Financial markets are expected to remain volatile as 
investors react to developments in the Middle East and a continued moderate recovery is 
expected post-Iraq as there is some pent-up demand in business spending. Consumer and 
business confidence should improve. 
However, the economy still appears to be working through a period of structural change. 
Corporate profits have improved, but more slowly than expected. As recently as a month 
ago, data had continued to suggest moderate growth in the U S. economy though the pace 
remained well below potential. Spending on capital equipment is soft and labor market 
conditions are weak. Higher energy prices and surging health care costs should limit 
consumer spending growth in the near term. Growth into 2004 is expected to remain 
moderate and insufficient to sustain robust growth in jobs. We expect 2003 GDP growth 
to be around 2.4% and for growth in 2004 to be around 3.2% with inflation remaining 
relatively stable. Two key factors in the coming months will be the global economy and 
bank lending. Global economic growth was disappointing in the second half of 2002 and 
potentially could remain relatively subdued in the months ahead. Also, a full economic 
recovery will not be in place until banks begin to lend again to businesses - especially to 
smaller firms (which don't have access to the equity and bond markets). 
Taken From: Brown, Dr. Scott. Economic Monitor - Weekly Commentary. Raymond 
James Financial. March 17, 2003 . < http://www.Ijfcornlmonitl.htm> 
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Section 1: 
Current Small Capitalization and Middle 
Capitalization Holdings in the Portfolio 
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• 1) J.M. Smucker Corp. (SJM) 
• 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current Price (3126/03): 
52 WeekRange: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Accumulate 
$35.48 
$28.71-$42.25 
Food, Diversified 
Mid-Cap Growth 
$1.68 Billion 
2 Shares 
Introduction: The J. M. Smucker Company, established in 1897 and incorporated in 
1921, is engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of food products on a worldwide 
basis, although the majority of its sales are in the United States. The Company's 
distribution outside the United States is principally in Canada, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, 
China and the Pacific Rim, Europe and the Middle East, although products are exported 
to other countries as well. International sales represented less than 1 5% of total 
consolidated Company sales for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2002 (fiscal 2002). 
The principal products of the Company are fruit spreads, dessert toppings, peanut 
butters, frozen peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, industrial fruit products, fruit and 
vegetable juices, beverages, syrups, condiments and gift packages. The Company's 
products are produced under the names Smucker's, Dickinson's, Lost Acres, Mary Ellen, 
Adams, Laura Scudder's, Goober, Simply Fruit, Magic Shell, Sundae Syrup, Smucker's 
Snackers, Uncrustables, R. W. Knudsen Family, After The Fall, Simply Nutritious, 
Recharge, Santa Cruz Organic and Spritzer. 
On June 1, 2002, the Company merged with the Jif peanut butter and Crisco 
shortening and oils businesses of The Procter & Gamble Company. With the addition of 
the Jif and Crisco businesses in fiscal 2003, fruit spreads, peanut butter and shortening 
and oils are together expected to make up approximately 75% of the Company's business. 
As a result of the merger, the Company sells products under the names Jif, Simply Jif, Jif 
Smooth Sensation and Crisco. In its domestic segment, the Company's products are 
primarily sold through brokers to chain, wholesale, cooperative, independent grocery 
accounts and other consumer markets, to foodservice distributors and chains including 
hotels, restaurants, schools and other institutions, and to other food manufacturers. With 
the completion of the Jif and Crisco merger, it is anticipated that in fiscal2003 the 
Company will have one customer, Wal-Mart and its affiliates, with net sales exceeding 
10%. 
Industry: The industry outlook looks strong. Given that this is the consumer food 
industry - an industry that is insulated from much of the cyclical nature of traditional 
business - it has done well in the current economic climate. It is predicted that the sharp 
decline in peanut prices (approximately 40%) will allow SJM to lower its prices onJif 
peanut butter without decreasing its margins. The food industry is doing well, and the 
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future will only yield an increase as the total food market continues to grow with the 
general population. 
SJM vs. S&P 500 - lyear: 
Past Performance: This Company is doing very well in several areas. The price to cash 
flow ratio is outstanding - outperforming all of its peers. Cash flow is a great measure of 
relative strength and future growth potential. The low price to book ratio, indicates that 
there may be some growth in the stock (undervalued) but the PIE ratio is in line with the 
industry, so in order for the price to increase much more, earnings would theoretically 
need to rise as well. As you can see from the sales figure, revenues are through the roof-
with a lot of strength in the growth of sales. The firm has low debt leveraging, there is 
the possibility to increase debt, and subsequently increase cash flow and earnings, but not 
likely given the conservative nature of the firm - however conservatism wins the game in 
the current economy as well as the long-term race in the consumer food sector. 
Sector: 
Industry: Food and 
J.M. Smucker Corp. (SJM) Company Consumer Bevera2e S&P 500 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 19.06 18.45 19.82 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 17.85 14.31 15.07 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 1.53 4.48 6.6 4.09 
Dividend Yield 2.34 2.64 2.72 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago 102.4 11.95 7.29 8.19 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.12 1.42 1.47 0.97 
EBITD Margin(TTM) 11.78 15.41 21.33 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 10.43 28.23 34.9 18.29 
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Outlook: The outlook for this firm looks great long-term. There are synergies taking 
place between the newly acquired Jif and Crisco brands that are resulting in true 
decreases in costs and increases in margins. The jelly and peanut butter brands are 
merging together fantastically and contributing new products to the market that the 
consumer is responding to very well (Uncrustables brand). The acquisitions have 
allowed for lower overhead costs in conjunction with increased capacity in plants. The 
lower cost Jif products will result in increased market share and the introduction of new 
loyal customers. 
Required 
J.M. Smucker Corp. Rate (CAPM) 6 .48% 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 4% 52.624 49.41996 
2004 5% 55.2552 48.73154 
2005 5% 58.01796 48.05272 
2006 5% 60.91886 47.38335 
2007 5% 63.9648 46.72331 
Terminal Value 4% 2678.833 1956.763 
Present value of 
FCF 2197.074 
Add non-op Assets 13.98 
Market Value of 
Firm 2211.054 
subtract pref. stock 0 
subtract debt 167.39 
Common Stock Equity 2043.664 
2002 shares outstanding 49.7 
SJM Valuation $ 41 .12 
We believe the assumptions used justify the model above given that corporate growth 
rates of9%, a dividend yield of2.3% and a beta of .43 are predicted, and consequently 
justify a growth of approximately 5% in FCF. 
The expected Return is: 18.20 
Recommendation: ACCUMULATE; utilize proceeds from sale of URI . 
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Recommendation: 
Current Price (3126/03): 
52 Week Range: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Sell shares to reach 5% of Portfolio, Hold remainder 
$21.70 
$14.25-$23.09 
Oil and Gas Operations 
Small-Cap Value 
$348 Million 
1050Shares 
Introduction: Holly Corporation, incorporated in 1947, is principally an independent 
petroleum refiner that produces high-value refined products such as gasoline, diesel fuel 
and jet fuel. Navajo Refining Company, L.P., (Navajo), one of the Company's wholly 
owned subsidiaries, owns a high-conversion petroleum refinery in Artesia, New Mexico, 
which Navajo operates in conjunction with crude, vacuum distillation and other facilities 
situated 65 miles away in Lovington, New Mexico (collectively, the Navajo Refmery). 
The Navajo Refinery has a crude capacity of60,000 barrels per day (BPD), can process a 
variety of sour (high-sulfur) crude oils and serves markets in the southwestern United 
States and northern Mexico. Holly also owns Montana Refining Company (MRC), a 
partnership that owns a 7,000 BPD petroleum refinery in Great Falls, Montana (Montana 
Refinery), which can process a variety of sour crude oils, and which primarily serves 
markets in Montana (Hoovers) . 
In conjunction with its refining operations, the Company operates approximately 
1,400 miles of pipeline as part of the supply and distribution network of the refineries. In 
addition, the Company has a 25% interest in Rio Grande Pipeline Company, which 
provides transportation ofliquid petroleum gases (LPG) to northern Mexico, and a 49% 
interest (50% prior to January 1, 2002) in NK Asphalt Partners, which manufactures and 
markets asphalt and asphalt products in Arizona and New Mexico. In addition to its 
refining and pipeline transportation operations, the Company also conducts a small-scale 
oil and gas exploration and production program and has a small investment in a joint 
venture conducting a retail gasoline station and convenience store business in Montana 
(Hoovers). 
Industry: The petroleum refining business is highly competitive. Among the Company's 
competitors are some of the world's largest integrated petroleum companies, which have 
their own crude oil supplies, distribution and marketing systems. The Company competes 
with independent refiners as well. Competition in particular geographic markets is 
affected primarily by the amounts of refined products produced by refineries located in 
such markets and by the availability of refined products and the cost of transportation to 
such markets from refineries located outside those markets (Hoovers). 
The price of crude oil is the engine that drives the energy industry. In the late 
1990s, in the wake of the Asian economic downturn, oil prices sank to $10 a barrel. The 
slump drove many small independents into bankruptcy and some larger oil companies 
into mergers. Subsequently, drilling activities were curtailed, causing a ripple effect: Oil 
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service companies (contract drillers, well maintenance firms, and others) had fewer rigs 
to service, pipeline and storage companies had less oil and gas to transport and store, and 
refineries produced less gasoline (Hoovers). 
But oil prices soared to as much as $30 a barrel in 2000, and the industry 
rebounded. The industry began to play catch-up, trying to develop oil and gas fields, 
accelerate production, and store more refined products. At the same time, pressure from 
environmental regulators for cleaner-burning gasoline drove up refining costs. Increased 
demand for natural gas to fuel power plants has encouraged more exploration for that 
resource as well. A weak global economy and reduced industrial and consumer demand, 
especially in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US, deflated oil 
prices and led to oil surpluses wor1dwide, curbing the industry wide momentum of the 
previous year. However, by early 2003, market jitters about an impending war with Iraq 
and a prolonged strike by oil workers in Venezuela spiked the price of oil to more than 
$30 a barrel again (Hoovers) . 
Past Performance: For the 3 months ended 10/31/02, revenues rose 7% to $275.7M. 
Net income fell 74% to $5.2M. Revenues reflect increased sales volume and higher 
refined product sales prices. Net income was offset by reduced refinery margins and the 
absence of a $1. 5M non-operating gain on the sale of equity securities (Multex). 
The ratio comparisons to follow reveal that the company has a PIE ratio 
equivalent to the general market, but has a lower ratio compared to its peers, this could 
indicate some upward stock price potential. A low price to cash flow ratio and low price 
to book ratio, in conjunction with a low debt to equity ratio and higher sales growth than 
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its sector peers could imply again, room to grow and some unrecognized value. It is 
currently paying a dividend yield lower, but close to its peers, and its ROE is higher than 
industry, in line with the sector (Zacks). 
Industry: Sector: Oil 
Holly Corp. (HOC) Company Energy and Gas S&PSOO 
PIE Ratio (fTM) 22.27 25.63 29.71 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 7.81 8.79 12.62 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 1.5 1.9 2.56 4.09 
Dividend Yield 1.98 2.46 2.8 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago 5.48 20.69 2.65 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.15 0.98 0.56 0.97 
EBITD Margin(TTM) 5.45 33.5 17.56 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 7.06 5.45 7.18 18.29 
Outlook: The future performance of this company is dependant upon several items: 
1) The legislative environment of the energy sector. If future exploration is inhibited, 
this company could face hard times in the future. 
2) Global supply and demand of fuel, in conjunction with fuel prices- if fuel prices 
remain high, or go higher and demand is constant or greater, this firm could do 
very well in years to come. 
3) Innovation- if alternative fuel sources are made mainstream and affordable, the 
global and domestic demand for oil and gas could decline substantially, but this is 
not foreseeable in the near future or short-term. 
Required 
Holly Corporation Rate (CAPM) 17.38% 
Present 
Growth OJo FCF Value 
2003 5.0% 81.0075 69.01214 
2004 5.0% 85.05788 61.73267 
2005 5.0% 89.31077 55.22105 
2006 5.0% 93.77631 49.39628 
2007 5.0% 98.46512 44.18591 
Terminal Value 2.0% 652.9551 293.0115 
Present value of 
FCF 572.5596 
Add non-op Assets 26.51 
Market Value of 
Firm 599.0696 
subtract pref. stock 211.56 
subtract debt 0 
Common Stock Equity 387.5096 
2002 shares outstanding 15.5 
HOC Valuation $ 25.00 
This model assumes a 5% FCF growth rate out a 91>/o average for the industry. The 
expected return is expected to be 17.2% including a 2% dividend yield . 
Recommendation: HOLD 
9 
• 3) City National (CYN) 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Introduction 
Hold 
$44.70 (3118103) 
$40.10-$56.42 
Regional Banks 
Value 
$2.2 3 billion 
200 
BUSINESS: City National Corp. owns City National Bank, which operates 55 branches 
in California and New York. Acquired American Pacific State Bank, 8/99; The Pacific 
Bank, N.A., 2/00; Reed, Conner & Birdwell, 12/00; Civic BanCorp, 2/02. Serves mostly 
middle market companies and affiuent individuals. Net loan losses, .69% of avg. loans in 
2002. As of 12/31/02, loan loss reserve, 2.06% of total loans; nonperforming assets, .90% 
of total loans. Loan portfolio at 12/31/02: commercial, 45%; real estate, 54%; installment, 
1%. Dir. and off own 19.9% of common stock, including Chairman Bram Goldsmith's 
14.0% (3/02 proxy). CEO: Russell Goldsmith. Inc.: DE. Address: 400 North Roxbury 
Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90210. Tel.: 310-888-6000. Web: www.cityntl.com. (Valueline) 
Industry 
The S&P Banks Index was down 3.3% in 2003 through February 7, outperforming a 
5.8% decrease for the S&P Super 1500 Index. For all of2002, the bank index was down 
2.7%, versus a 22.5% fall for the 1500. We believe larger cap bank earnings will remain 
weak, due to credit quality pressures and lackluster equity market conditions. Fourth 
quarter earnings for the group were uninspiring, with little revenue growth, high loan 
chargeoffs continuing, and weak capital markets activity. We believe bank share prices 
are likely to tum in a performance more in line with that of the broader market over the 
next six to nine months, as investors wait for signs that credit quality deterioration has 
stopped, and that better loan growth has resumed. We also expect gradually higher 
interest rates, starting in mid-2003, making it difficult for the group to outperform. 
Reasonably healthy consumer loan growth was offset by weak commercial lending in 
2002. We believe this environment will continue into 2003. Consumer spending has 
remained surprisingly healthy throughout the latest recession. Commercial lending, 
however, has been particularly hard hit, both in terms ofloan growth and of credit quality. 
Since credit quality generally lags economic recoveries, we do not expect much 
improvement until more robust economic growth resumes. High profile bankruptcies by 
some large commercial credits, such as Enron, Kmart, Global Crossing, etc., took a 
• significant toll earlier in 2002. Although credit quality has stabilized, we suspect that it 
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will take until the second or third quarter of 2003 before meaningful credit quality 
improvement is seen. 
The outlook for the longer term is challenged by the growth potential of revenues. 
Traditional lending is a mature business, and it is difficult for this area to grow much 
faster than the pace of the broader economy. We continue to favor banks with diversified 
revenue mixes, both by product set and geographically, as they should have an easier 
time in posting EPS growth in a range of economic environments. Merger activity 
remains subdued; we believe this reflects falling currencies (i.e., stock prices), as well as 
a desire on the part of bank managements to remain risk averse. (S&P) 
Past Performance 
CYN is positioned nicely as a value play. PIE ratios and P/B ratios are below industry 
and sector averages. Price to cash flow is within Industry and Sector averages. CYN' s 
dividend yield is below the industry average, but this does not cause too much concern at 
this time, as CYN's year-over-year sales are greater than industry averages, as well as its 
ROE . 
11 
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Industry: Sector: 
Regional Financial 
City National (CYN) Company Banks Services S&P500 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 12.25 13.21 16.72 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 12.25 11.66 13.87 15.62 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 1.95 2.11 2.14 4.09 
Dividend Yield 1.88 3.04 2.58 2.33 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago -2.49 -10.48 -4.59 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) N/A N/A N/A 0.98 
EBITD Marein(TTM) NIA NIA N/A 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 17.61 17.50 15.41 18.29 
Outlook 
City National plans to acquire Convergent Capital Management (CCM), a Chicago-based 
holding company investing in a broad range of asset management firms, for $49 million 
(consisting of cash and the assumption of$7.5 million ofCCM debt). This will nearly 
doubles City National's assets under management, to $13.9 billion. The bank is going into 
the very promising wealth management business, following the takeover ofNorth 
American Trust Company in 1998 and the acquisition ofReed, Conner & Birdwell in 
2000. Furthermore, the purchase strengthens the company's position in California, while 
providing exposure to several new states (i.e., Texas, Hawaii, Michigan, and Illinois) . 
CYN' s relationship-banking model has created a rock-solid customer (and lower-cost 
core deposit) base. This business strategy has also enabled City National to consistently 
achieve higher-than-industry-average net interest margins, while maintaining excellent 
asset quality. Moreover, acquisitions should continue to play an important role in the 
company's expansion. 
These shares have suitability for conservative investors, based on their healthy risk-
adjusted 3- to 5-year total return possibilities. Steady earnings growth should push up the 
issue's price over time. The low payout ratio suggests that increases in the dividend will 
continue to enhance returns, as well. But the equity is only an Average selection for 
Timeliness. (Valueline) 
CYN has also been aggressively buying back its own shares, with 9 million shares 
repurchased since 1995. In January of2003, the board approved the repurchase of an 
additional 1 million, since most of the shares previously authorized for repurchased have 
in fact been repurchased. CYN currently has approximately 49 million shares 
outstanding . 
12 
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Valuation method 
Current 5 year growth estimates for CYN are currently around 10% per year. Given this 
estimate, we feel that the following growth rates in FCF are justified. 
Required 
City National (CYN) Rate (CAPM) 8 .25o/o 
Present 
Growth o/o FCF Value 
2003 8.0% 135.216 124.9109 
2004 7.0% 144.6811 123.4685 
2005 6.0% 153.362 120.9021 
2006 5.0% 161.0301 117.2723 
2007 4.0% 167.4713 112.6681 
Tenninal Value 3.5% 3649.111 2454.978 
Present value of 
FCF 3054.2 
Add non-op Assets 0 
Market Value of 
Finn 3054.2 
subtract pref. stock 0 
subtract debt 760 
Common Stock Equity 2294.2 
2002 shares outstanding 49.9 
CYN Valuation $ 45.98 
1 year Expected Return: 8.25% 
We feel that CYN is appropriately priced in the market, and therefore we would expect 
future returns to coincide with the CAPM model for investors required rate of return. 
Recommendation: Hold 
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Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Introduction 
Hold 
$35.91 (3/18/03) 
$33.20-$50.50 
Appliance and Tools 
Value 
$2.82 billion 
227 
BUSINESS: Black & Decker manufactures and services power tools and accessories 
(71% of 2001 sales) for the professional and do-it-yourself markets. BDK also sells 
building products (18%), fastening and assembly systems (11%). Brand names: Black & 
Decker, DeWalt, Dustbuster, Toast-R-Oven, Emhart, Kwikset, and Price Pfister. Sold 
PRC, 1995. Divested household appliance and recreational products divisions, 6/98. 
International sales: 32% of '0 1 total. Has approximately 22,700 employees, 16,650 
shareholders. Officers & directors own 3.3% of common stock; FMR, 15.0%; (3/02 
proxy). Chairman, President, and CEO: NolanD. Archibald. Inc.: MD. Addr.: 701 East 
Joppa Road, Towson, MD 21204. Tel.: 410-716-3900. Internet: 
www. blackanddecker.com. (V alueline) 
Industry 
Our near-term investment outlook for the household appliances industry in 2003 is 
modestly positive. Year to date through February 14, 2003, the S&P Household 
Appliances Index is down 13.5%, compared to the S&P 1500's gain of5.3%. Weakness 
in appliance shares has made some valuations more attractive. 
Aggressive interest rate cuts by the Fed were factors in an improving economic 
environment, and strong housing activity and increased demand for household durables 
bode well for earnings of appliance manufacturers and retailers. Although we expect 
housing activity to decline in 2003, this industry's longer-term uptrend in sales and 
earnings is likely to continue in 2003 . 
The Fed's cuts in interest rates, surprising strength in housing activity in 2002, economic 
improvement in the U.S. and a greater focus on the home following September 11 should 
outweigh higher unemployment, weak consumer confidence, and increased pricing 
pressure to support the shares. According to S&P Economics, housing starts are estimated 
to have risen 5.5% in 2002, and are projected to decline 7.7% in 2003 before rebounding 
4.4% in 2004. Homeowners tend to spend more of their disposable income on new 
furniture within one year after buying a new home than at any other time . 
14 
We attribute the S&P Household Appliances Index out performance in 2002 versus the 
S&P 1500 to consumers' resilience in purchasing durables such as furniture, appliances 
and automobiles. Selected major appliance wholesale shipments were up almost 5% in 
2002, as a rebound in the first half of the year, versus a weak 2001, was followed by 
continued demand in the second half In contrast, S&P believes the US. economy in 
2002 grew just 2.5%, on a real basis. For 2003, we expect appliance shipments to rise in 
the low single digits. 
Demographics are making appliance and furniture manufacturers and retailers happy. The 
targeted 35-to-64 year-old population group is the fastest growing segment in the US., 
and includes those who have reached their peak spending years. This group includes 
those who are likely to replace earlier purchases of major durables, such as appliances 
and furniture. (S&P) 
Past Performance 
Most of the ratios ofBDK place it near the averages for the Appliance and Tool Industry, 
as well as the Consumer Cyclical Sector. BDK has an average PIE ratio for the industry, 
a slightly below average price to cash flow, and a well below average price to book 
BDK pays a lower dividend than the industry average, but had a better EBITD margin 
and an exceptional ROE, which justifies the lower payout ratio. 
One area of possible risk stems from the debt to equity ratio of the BDK Company, which 
is significantly higher than industry or sector averages. While this is not extremely high, 
this number should be monitored in future years. 
15 
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Industry: Sector: 
Appliance & Consumer 
Black & Decker (BDK) Company Tool Cyclical S&PSOO 
P/E Ratio (TTM) 12.09 11.70 13.62 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 7.77 8.13 9.20 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 4.56 7.15 2.76 4.09 
Dividend Yield 1.40 3.03 3.01 2.33 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago 3.50 4.98 6.08 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 2.08 1.47 0.93 0.98 
EBITD Mar2in(TTM) 11.33 10.04 11.04 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 29.51 23.35 15.22 18.29 
Outlook 
The company recently reported a hefty 67% improvement in third-quarter share net. In 
addition, despite the slowly rebounding U.S. economy, most of the company's divisions 
reported at least modest sales improvements, which, in conjunction with improving 
margins, led to better-than-expected earnings. (Valueline) 
Recently, BDK announced that it would eliminate 1,300 manufacturing positions in 
Easton, Maryland and shift most of the work to a Mexican facility. All told, the 
restructuring plan ought to generate about $60 million in cost savings during the coming 
year. (Valueline) 
Over the coming months, the company will introduce a number of new consumer 
products, including The Swivel, a 12-volt drill with a rotating head; The Bulls Eye, a laser 
level; and a zip saw multi-tool. And the company's DeWalt professional products division 
will increase its product portfolio, although at nowhere near the level of last year, when 
DeWalt had its largest product launch ever. (Valueline) 
Over the last few years, the company has liquidated a number of noncore businesses, 
focusing its attention instead on improving its three primary businesses. In addition, 
Black & Decker should reap the rewards of its Six Sigma cost-cutting program, which is 
aimed at improving operating efficiencies across a majority of its product and geographic 
segments. (V alueline) 
On a negative note, Home depot reported in early 2003 that power tool sales appeared 
sluggish, which generally hurt most in this industry. A hubbub recently erupted 
concerning the tripling ofthe bonus paid to the CEO, yet it is not expected that this will 
have a material impact on the performance ofBDK. 
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Valuation method 
Current 5 year growth estimates for BDK are currently around 13% per year. Given this 
estimate, we feel that the following growth rates in FCF are justified. 
Black & Decker Required 
(BDK) Rate (CAPM) 11.50o/o 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 3.0% 365.65 327.9372 
2004 3.0% 376.6195 302.9375 
2005 3.0% 387.9181 279.8436 
2006 3.0% 399.5556 258.5103 
2007 3.0% 411.5423 238.8032 
Terminal Value 2.5% 4687.009 2719.703 
Present value of 
FCF 4127.735 
Add non-op Assets 0 
Market Value of 
Firm 4127.735 
subtract pref. stock 0 
subtract debt 1244 
Common Stock Equity 2883.735 
2002 shares outstanding 79.6 
BDK Valuation $ 36.23 
1 Year Expected Return: 11.50% 
We currently feel that BDK is appropriately priced in the market, and therefore feel that 
the expected rate of return for BDK will be substantially similar to the CAPM required 
rate of return for investors. 
Recommendation: Hold 
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• Danaher Corp. (DHR) 
• 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Introduction 
HOLD 
$67.38 (3118103) 
$52.60-$75.46 
Scientific and Technical Instruments 
Mid-Cap Growth 
$9.59 billion 
245 Shares 
Danaher has two business segments: controls and tools. Danaher's controls group 
produces a wide range of monitoring, sensing, controlling, and testing products. Notable 
brands include Veeder-Root (measuring and leak-detection systems for underground fuel-
storage tanks), Fluke (devices for measuring electronic voltage, frequency, pressure, and 
temperature), and Pacific Scientific (electric motors, drives, and safety equipment). The 
company also produces mechanics' hand tools, automotive specialty tools, and 
accessories, which it makes under numerous brand names, including Sears' line of 
Craftsman tools. 
Industry 
The manufacturing industry has been hit hard over the past year worse even than the S&P 
500. Most of their sales are to other companies who have had their budgets cut and are 
no longer purchasing at the rates they once were. This trend is expected to continue for 
as long as the economy continues to struggle . 
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• 
Past Performance 
Danaher is for the most part in line with the industry or outperforming it in terms of PIE 
ratio, Price to Cash Flow, Price to Book, Sales v. 1 Year Ago, Debt to Equity, EBITD 
Margin, and Return on Equity. Though their dividend yield is substantially lower than 
the industry average, the company has invested in acquisitions and returned the money 
back into the company which is not necessarily a bad thing. 
IDdustry: Sector: Danaher Corp. (DHR) Company Scientific& Technology S&P500 TechnicaliDstr. 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 23.07 23.82 32.2 21.78 
Price to Cash Flow (TTM) 18.07 20.46 25.7 16.23 
Price to Book (MRQ) 3.26 3.99 4.28 4.09 
Dividend Yield 0.16 1.01 0.96 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs TTM 1 Yr. Ago 21.01 8.41 5.37 4.11 
Total Debt to Equity (MRQ) 0.44 0.75 0.33 0.97 
EBITD Margin (TTM) 18.15 11.52 13.95 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 16.11 10.84 9.21 18.29 
Outlook (from ValueLine) 
Most analysts expect 2003 to be successful for Danaher. Restructuring efforts that began 
in late 2001 are nearly completed and all of2002's acquisitions are now fully integrated. 
Management expects these maneuvers will result in just under $40 million in annual 
savings. Additionally, new environmental regulations have been put in place for heavy 
trucks that should translate into increased demand for DHR's environmental-control 
products. Too, based on its hefty cash balance and solid financial footing, we see no 
reason why the company will fall off of its torrid acquisition pace that has fueled its 
growth over the last several years. The company's push into low-cost regions should 
enhance future earnings. Currently, 11% of sourcing and 14% of production is done in 
Mexico and Slovakia. And we look for these numbers to rise to 30% each by the end of 
2005, thereby generating savings of approximately $100 million . 
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Valuation 
Danaher Corp. Required 
(DHR) Rate (CAPM) 9.81 o.ro 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 11% 134.199 122.210181 
2004 11% 148.9609 123.534561 
2005 11% 165.3466 124.873292 
2006 11% 183.5347 126.226532 
2007 11% 203.7235 127.594436 
Tenninal Value 9% 16873.28 10567.9361 
Present value of 
FCF 11192.3751 
LTD 1197.4 
9,994.98 
2002 shares outstanding 152.5 
DHR Valuation $ 65.54 
1 Year Expected Return: 9.8% 
We currently feel that DHR is appropriately priced in the market, and therefore feel that 
the expected rate of return for DHR will be substantially similar to the CAPM required 
rate of return for investors. 
• Recommendation: HOLD DHR 
• 
At a market cap of9.59 billion, DHR is above the upper limit for mid-cap stocks. That 
being said, the company's outlook is strong as they are positioned well for future growth 
once the economy and the industry turns around. While there is nothing overtly negative 
about the stock to force us to sell, there is nothing outstanding about it either . 
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• McCormick & Company, Inc. (MKC) 
• 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
SELL 
$24.56 (3/18/03) 
$20.70-$27.25 
Food Products 
Mid-Cap Growth 
$3.34 billion 
740 shares 
Introduction (from Hoovers) 
McCormick & Company is the world's #1 spice maker. It makes an assortment of spices, 
seasonings, flavorings, sauces, and extracts. McCormick distributes its products -- sold to 
consumers under brands including Club House, Ducros, McCormick, and Schwartz, as 
well as under private labels -- to retailers, the food service industry, and industrial food 
processors worldwide. Its packaging unit supplies plastic tubes and bottles for its own 
products and for food and personal care companies. An employee profit-sharing plan 
owns nearly 30% ofMcCormick and former CEO Harry Wells owns 7%. 
Industry (from Hoovers) 
The company's earnings were erratic in the 1990s, partly because of a price war with rival 
Bums, Philp, but also due to the decline ofhome cooking in the US. McCormick has 
countered with increased advertising and a growing emphasis on industrial sales to flavor 
the foods eaten outside the home. McCormick has also been expanding internationally 
through its Ducros spice business and operations in China to counter their declining sales 
domestically. While the industry has done better than the S&P 500 over the past year, 
MKC has not been able to separate itself from its industry and outperform its competition . 
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• 
Past Performance 
MKC has performed favorably in the past with most of the financial ratios doing better or 
in line with the industry. EBITD and Dividend Yield are worse than the industry 
however. This can be explained however by the price wars driving down earnings in the 
industry and MKC investing money into new initiatives in order to remain profitable. 
Industry: Sector: 
McCormick & Co. (MKC) Company Food Consumer S&PSOO 
Processing Non-Cyclical 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 18.73 18.45 19.82 21.78 
Price to Cash Flow (TTM) 14.82 14.31 15.07 16.23 
Price to Book (MRQ) 5.59 4.48 6.6 4.09 
Dividend Yield 1.86 2.64 2.72 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs TTM 1 Yr. Ago 4.58 11.35 7.67 4.11 
Total Debt to Equity (MRQ) 1 1.42 1.47 0.97 
EBITD Margin (TTM) 14.85 15.41 21.33 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 33.8 28.23 34.9 18.29 
Outlook (from ValueLine) 
In 2003, earnings are expected to be $1.40 a share. This estimate is approximately five 
cents below prior estimates for a couple of reasons. First, while operating margins are 
expanding nicely, the growth in 2002 was a less than expected. Second, MKC will have 
to incur expenses related to the implementation of its "Beyond 2000" program in the U.S. 
industrial businesses. It will, however, reap the benefits this year from that plan, which is 
already in place in the U.S. consumer business. Looking ahead to 2004, earnings are 
estimated to be $1.5 5 on revenues of a bit over $2.4 billion. 
Valuation 
Required 
McCormick {MKC) Rate (CAPM) 5.72% 
Present 
Growth o;o FCF Value 
2003 10% 124.3 117.580287 
2004 8% 134.244 120.121751 
2005 6% 142.2986 120.445591 
2006 4% 147.9906 118.491619 
2007 4% 153.9102 116.569345 
Terminal Value 2% 4225.798 3200.55807 
Present value of 
FCF 3793.76666 
LTD 453.9 
3,339.87 
2002 shares outstanding 140 
MKC Valuation $ 23.86 
• 1 Year Expected Return: 5.3% 
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• We currently feel that MKC is over priced in the market, and therefore feel that the 
expected rate of return for MKC will be lower than the CAPM required rate of return for 
investors. 
• 
• 
Recommendation: SELL MKC 
McCormick & Co. is an average company in an industry facing increased pressures due 
to external social factors. The company's plans for future growth are adequate but not 
outstanding enough to warrant holding the stock in light of other investment opportunities . 
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• The Talbots, Inc. (TLB) 
• 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Introduction 
Sell 
$26.25 (03126/03) 
$20.59-$39.64 
Apparel Stores 
Mid Cap Growth 
$1.4 billion 
515 
"In the trend-driven world of women's fashion, The Talbots is a constant. After a 
flirtation with hipper styles, the purveyor of women's apparel, accessories, and shoes has 
returned to its hallmark traditional wares. Talbots has about 870 stores in the US, Canada, 
and the UK, mostly in malls and specialty centers. Its flagship chain specializes in selling 
mostly private-label, classically styled apparel, accessories, and shoes for misses. Other 
stores target children, petites, and plus sizes. A clothing line for men was introduced in 
October 2002. Talbots, founded in 1947, also sells through its catalog and Web site. 
Tokyo-based retailer AEON owns about 60% ofthe company." (Hoovers.com, 03/16/03) 
Industry 
"The companies that make up the Retail (Special Lines) Industry are a diverse assortment 
of merchants operating in a variety of retail sub sectors . 
We can report that many of the retailers included in this review performed poorly during 
the just-concluded fiscal fourth quarter, reflecting erratic economic news, weak consumer 
confidence and the loss of job security, and rising concerns over the potential for war in 
the Middle East. The 2002 holiday calendar was a significant drawback as well. 
The near-term outlook for the specialty retailers is still clouded, though some of these 
merchants proved their mettle during last year's most difficult retail environment. We 
would continue to focus on those companies specifically, as well as on those operators 
who, though hurt by one of the more trying holiday seasons in a decade, have shown in 
past years the ability to make needed adjustments that enable their bottom lines to bounce 
back quickly. 
It probably can't get much worse for the retail sector in 2003. As we noted previously, 
2002's all-important holiday selling season (officially the day after Thanksgiving to 
Christmas Eve) contained six fewer shopping days (26) versus the prior year, allowing 
consumers even less time to prepare their spending strategies. This year, consumers will 
gain an extra day during the key fourth-quarter holiday period, thereby lessening the 
calendar's effect in 2003. But, national and world events will likely continue to weigh on 
the consumer, most notably the threat of a war with Iraq, possibly within weeks or 
months of this report's preparation, though the debates are still going on. And, job losses 
continue to mount as many companies look for ways to trim expenses, at least until clear 
signs of a strengthening economy emerge. Indeed, the Conference Board's reading of 
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• 
• 
Consumer Confidence registered a nine-year low in January (79.0), and represented the 
seventh decline in the last eight months." (Valueline.com 03/16/03) 
TLB vs S&PSOO - 1 yr: 
Past Performance 
This stock was already part of our portfolio, and was classified as a Mid Cap Growth 
Stock. But if we take a look at the PIE ratio, we might now classify it as a Mid Cap 
Value. The PIE ratio is significantly lower than the industry average. Also, the Price to 
Cash Flow and Price to Book ratio's are below the industry average. This is a concern 
because the stock was purchased as a growth stock, and has slipped into a Value status. 
The Dividend yield is acceptable. The Sales trend is negative. The firm is not leveraged 
enough. Finally we see a good EBITD Margin and the Return on Equity is good. 
However, with more leverage the ROE would even be better. 
Industry: Sector: 
The Talbots, Inc. (TLB) Company Apparel Clothing S&PSOO 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 11.76 26.37 22.74 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 8.03 10.30 14.42 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 2.53 3.24 3.18 4.09 
Dividend Yield 1.49 1.31 2.82 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago -3.37 6.03 10.92 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.27 0.42 0.98 0.97 
EBITD Margin(TTM) 16.32 11.44 22.47 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 22.49 18.86 12.64 18.29 
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Outlook 
Talbots, Inc. is an average company in a bad industry. Talbots actually outperformed 
their most recent quarterly earning forecast by a penny, but their earnings were still down 
$4 million over the same period from last year. With the economic uncertainty, there are 
no companies in this industry that really excite us, and Talbots, Inc. is no exception. 
Required 
Talbots Inc. (TLB) Rate (CAPM) 11.18°./0 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 10% 68.97 62.03733 
2004 10% 75.867 61 .38166 
2005 8% 81.93636 59.62869 
2006 8% 88.49127 57.91536 
2007 8% 95.57057 56.2715 
Terminal Value 5% 1623.772 956.8433 
Present value of 
FCF 1254.078 
2002 shares outstanding 60.4 
TLB Value of operations per share $ 20.76 
Nonoperating assets per share $ -
Debt per share $ 1.66 
Preferred Stock per share $ -
Valuation $ 19.11 
1 year Expected Return: 9.80% 
Recommendation: Sell 
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• 8) United Rentals (URI) 
• 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current Price (3127103): 
52 Week Range: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Sell 
$10.36 
$5.88- $30.83 
Financial Services 
Small-Cap Value 
$728 Million 
435 Shares 
Introduction: United Rentals, Inc., incorporated in October 1997, is an equipment rental 
company that offers over 600 types of equipment for rent, ranging from heavy machines 
and hand tools to its network of more than 7 40 rental locations in the United States, 
Canada and Mexico. The Company's customers include construction and industrial 
companies, manufacturers, utilities, municipalities, homeowners and others. In 2001, the 
Company served more than 1.4 million customers and completed over 8.4 million rental 
transactions. In March 2002, the Company acquired S&R Equipment Company from 
Fluor Corporation. S&R Equipment, founded in 1957, was in the equipment rental 
business, specializing in the aerial and high-lift equipment rental, service and sale 
business, predominantly in Ohio, Indiana and Michigan. 
Industry: This Company is in an unusual industry and is affected by the influences 
between financial services due to its leasing, and the construction industry due to its 
heavy usage by that sector. Greenspan spent much of the last half of2001lowering 
federal interest rates, and the resulting drop in home mortgage rates has cemented a 
demand for homes that began during the booming economy of the late 1990s. Thanks to 
the historically low rates (below 7% ), residential construction firms as a whole have been 
insulated from the generally dismal economy and stock market. Likewise, companies that 
sell and supply building products, including The Home Depot, have been helped by the 
boom. Despite this, there is concern that the construction boom will have a downturn 
soon. 
United Rentals is also seriously affected by the downturn in manufacturing and 
utilities. It is very responsive to the general climate of the economy as a whole. As a 
result, it has been hard hit by the economic downturn of the last 24 months. 
Consequently, there is not much positive news or forecasting for this industry in the near 
term, and the long-term is way too unstable to predict at this time. The outlook for this 
industry is currently negative . 
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Past Performance: The ratio analysis for this company makes our necessary future 
actions for this stock very clear. It has negative earnings, declining cash flow, very low 
price to book, negative sales trends, increasing debt, and negative return on equity. All of 
this is combined with an industry in which there is not a positive outlook. 
Industry: Sector: 
Financial Construction 
United Rentals Corp. (URI) Company Senrices Rentals S&PSOO 
PIE Ratio (TTM) NM 12.76 22.74 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 1.65 3.46 14.42 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 0.47 1.23 3.18 4.09 
Dividend Yield NA 2.26 2.82 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago -2.27 -1.55 10.92 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 1.74 1.39 0.98 0.97 
EBITD Mar2in(TTM) 17.62 27.32 22.47 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) -7.3 10.01 12.64 18.29 
Outlook: The outlook for this company and industry combined is negative. There is no 
positive news from the stock performance, company performance, or the industry. The 
only redeeming factor for this firm would be a major turnaround in the economy, which 
is not forecasted for the near future. They are closing about 40 stores this year in an 
effort to cut costs and increase cash-flow, but this is merely survival and window 
dressing, it doesn't really add true strength to the firm . 
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United Rentals Required 
(URI) Rate (CAPM) 14.69% 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 1.0% 349.965 305.1532 
2004 1.0% 353.4647 268.7403 
2005 1.0% 356.9993 236.6723 
2006 1.0% 360.5693 208.431 
2007 1.0% 364.175 183.5596 
Tenninal Value 1.0% 2687.736 1354.733 
Present value of 
FCF 2557.289 
Add non-op Assets 223.09 
Market Value of 
Finn 2780.379 
subtract pref. stock 226.55 
subtract debt 2719.82 
Common Stock Equity -165.991 
2002 shares outstanding 76.6 
URI Valuation $ (2.17) 
This stock should be sold due to the expected negative return: -121%. We know that a 
stock cannot be worth less than $0, but since the debt exceeds the value of the firm there 
is clearly a problem with the future value and expected growth potential of this firm. 
• Recommendation: SELL all of the holding • 
• 
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STI CLASSIC FD-SM CAP GROWTH- SSCFX 
Morningstar rating: ****Four Star 
NAV: $11.77 
Net Assets: $22.37 Million 
Recommendation: SELL 
Introduction: 
STI Classic Small Cap Growth Stock Fund seeks growth. The fund primarily invests in 
small U.S. companies with market capitalizations between $50 million and $3 billion. It 
invests in companies that the adviser believes demonstrates above-average earnings 
growth and sales growth potential. {Moneycentral.msn.com 03/05/03) 
Past Performance: 
In the 52 weeks period, SSCFX had a price depreciation of26.74%. 
Sector Weights: 
Healthcare 17.99 
Business Services 15.11 
Consumer Services 12.54 
Hardware 12.51 
Industrial Materials 11.65 
Energy 8.54 
Consumer Goods 7.6 
Software 7.45 
Financial Services 5.94 
Telecommunications 0.63 
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Top 25 Holdings: 
Ticker Company Name %Net Assets YTDReturn 
KDE 4 Kids Entrtnmt 1.48% -16 94% 
CVD Covance 1.40% 1.63% 
CRL Charles River Labs 1.25% -22.43% 
PPDI Pharmaceutical Product Dev 1.25% 0.31% 
STE STERIS 1.21% -2.56% 
HYSL Hyperion Solutions 1.15% 8.69% 
POSS Possis Medical 1.14% 10.61% 
PHCC Priority Healthcare Cl B 1.13% -9.27% 
COIT Cott 1.13% -4 21% 
MRCY Mercury Comp Sys 1.11% 4.19% 
CACI CACIIntl 1.10% 5.78% 
MMSI Merit Medical Sys 1.10% -10 54% 
DORL DoralFinl 1.05% 1.22% 
TARO Taro Pllarma Inds 1.03% -11 .61% 
ACDO Accredo Health 1.02% -21 .02% 
LSTR Landstar Sys 1.01% -9.84% 
!ART Integra LifeSciences Hldgs 1.01% -5.55% 
HDWR Headwaters 0.99% -U8% 
FCN FTI Consult 0 .98% 1.25% 
CDIS Cal Dive Intl 0 .98% -8.89% 
• 
ALLY Alliance Gaming 0.97% -12.80% 
ATK Alliant Tecllsystems 0.95% -19.81% 
GYMB Gymboree 0.90% -11.73% 
NOI National-Oilwell 0.89% -1 800/o 
CRK Comstock Resources 0.89% 4.52% 
Total number of holdings 196 
%Assets in top 10 holdings 12.25 
Turnover(%) 112 
Valuation Measures: 
Jinvestrnent Valuation Stock Portfolio Category 
!Price/Book 3.10 3.63 
!Price/Earnings I 25.42 26.70 
IPrice/Cash Flow 14.10 15.90 
jPrice/Sales 2.06 3.08 
• 
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Management: 
The STI small cap growth fund is managed by Mr. Mark Garfinkle, ofTrusco's Atlanta 
office. He has managed the fund since its inception in 1998. Mr. Garfinkle possesses the 
CF A designation, an MBA from Vanderbilt, and over 13 years of investment experience. 
Fees and Expenses: 
Total Expense Ratio 
Maximum Sales Fees 
Initial 
Deferred 
Redemption 
2.29% 
0.00% 
2.00% 
0.00% 
Recommendation: SELL 
Maximum Other Fees 
Administrative 
Management 
12b-l 
NA 
1.15% 
0.75% 
Because the only representation for Small Cap stocks for the Crummer Portfolio is going 
to be through Small Cap blends, we don' t feel SSCFX is the right fund. Because the 
Crummer portfolio has identified Small Cap stocks as stocks with a capitalization under 
$1 billion, we feel it would be appropriate to have a fund that identifies small cap stocks 
in a similar manner. SSCFX invests in companies with a capitalization up to $3 billion. 
Another negative for SSCFX is that the management fees are relatively high at 2.29%. 
Finally, the fund has outperformed its category over a three year time period, but over the 
last year it has grossly underperformed its category, and we simply feel there are better 
funds out there . 
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Section 2: 
Analyst Recommendations for Middle 
Capitalization Growth Stocks 
I Mid C-ap- Growth Screen I 
,Market Cap 
L 
$1 - $8 billion 
( IE > 15 
;I>/B 
~ 
>2 
jDiv. Yield >3% 
1
I yr. EPS growth >10% 
I yr. Rev growth >25% 
• 
1
I yr. Inc. growth >5% 
;Avg. EPS growth est. >industry 
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• 1) Coach, Inc. (COH) 
• 
• 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Introduction: 
$39.93(3/27/03) 
$18.13-$37.33 
Textile/Apparel 
Mid-Cap Growth 
$3.32 billion 
Coach, Inc. is a designer, producer and marketer of accessories for men and women, 
including handbags, business cases, luggage and travel accessories, personal 
planning products, leather outerwear, gloves and scarves. For the 26 weeks ended 
12/28/02, net sales increased 30% to $501.3M. Net income increased 50% to $84.9M. 
Results reflect the growing market share in the US and Japan, improved gross profit 
margins and a $275K interest income. 
Industry: 
Many of the retailers included in this review performed poorly during the just-concluded 
fiscal fourth quarter, reflecting erratic economic news, weak consumer confidence and 
the loss of job security, and rising concerns over the potential for war in the Middle East. 
The 2002 holiday calendar was a significant drawback as well . 
The near-term outlook for the specialty retailers is still clouded, though some of these 
merchants proved their mettle during last year's most difficult retail environment. It 
probably can't get much worse for the retail sector in 2003. 2002's all-important holiday 
selling season (officially the day after Thanksgiving to Christmas Eve) contained six 
fewer shopping days (26) versus the prior year, allowing consumers even less time to 
prepare their spending strategies. This year, consumers will gain an extra day during the 
key fourth-quarter holiday period, thereby lessening the calendar's effect in 2003. But, 
national and world events will likely continue to weigh on the consumer, most notably 
the threat of a war with Iraq, possibly within weeks or months of this report's preparation, 
though the debates are still going on. And, job losses continue to mount as many 
companies look for ways to trim expenses, at least until clear signs of a strengthening 
economy emerge. Indeed, the Conference Board's reading of Consumer Confidence 
registered a nine-year low in January (79.0), and represented the seventh decline in the 
last eight months. 
Many of the retailers catering primarily to the needs of home-centered consumers (so-
called nesters) performed relatively well compared to other important specialty retailing 
sectors, including apparel, books and music, and toys. Recent management changes and 
more conservative accounting treatments should also provide investors with a reason to 
take another look at retail issues, especially since many are now more attractively priced . 
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COB vs. S&P 500 - 1 year: 
Past Performance: 
Coach is evidently a very strong performer in its industry, sector, and the overall market. 
It exceeds its peers by a large margin in every ratio analyzed. 
Industry: Sector: S&P 
Coach, Inc (COH) Compan)' Textile Apparel 500 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 29.85 15.91 13.62 22.23 
Price To Cash Flow 23.63 12.45 9.2 15.62 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 9.9 3.27 2.76 4.17 
Dividend Yield NA 1.88 3.01 2.33 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago 29.46 6.77 6.08 4.17 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.14 0.34 0.93 0.98 
EBITD Ma.,;n(TTM) 25.31 14.33 11.04 20.21 
Return On Equity (TTM) 44.68 21.03 15.22 18.38 
Outlook 
In my opinion, the market is still growing in acceptance of this product. Simultaneously, 
Coach is meeting the needs of the market by providing some lower priced offerings to 
meet the needs of more middle class consumers. There is also the new Men's line that is 
growing and expected to do well and gain market share. Coach will continue to 
outperform both the marker and its peers into the future . 
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Required 
Coach, Inc. (COH) Rate (CAPM) 12.15% 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 30.0% 86.099 76.77129 
2004 30.0% 111 .9287 88.99035 
2005 20.0% 134.3144 95.21928 
2006 20.0% 161 .1773 101.8842 
2007 20.0% 193.4128 109.0156 
Tenninal Value 8.9% 6489.222 3657.6 
Present value of 
FCF 4129.481 
Add non-op Assets 26.29 
Market Value of 
Finn 4155.771 
subtract pref. stock 0 
subtract debt 29.42 
Common Stock Equity 4126.351 
2002 shares outstanding 90.1 
COH Valuation $ 45.80 
We believe that Coach is a good buy given its expected return of 14.7% with no dividend 
yield. 
Recommendation: BUY 
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• 2) Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. (KKD) 
• 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Introduction 
BUY 
$34.21 (03/26/03) 
$26.42-$44.02 
Restaurants 
Mid Cap Growth 
$1.8 billion 
"Did you hear about the Krispy Kreme Doughnuts baker who quit his job? He just got 
tired of the hole business. The company runs a chain of about 270 shops in 37 states and 
Canada that offer its signature doughnuts, which have gained cult popularity in some 
areas. Krispy Kreme also sells pastries, fruit pies, and honey buns. About 60% of its 
locations are owned or affiliated with the company. In addition, Krispy Kreme sells its 
wares to grocery and convenience stores and sells ingredients and equipment to 
franchisees. Krispy Kreme was founded in 1937. 
About 120 Krispy Kreme shops sell doughnuts directly to grocery and convenience stores 
under its own brand and private labels (Kroger accounts for 8% of sales). The company 
also collects revenue from its manufacturing and distribution division (KKM&D), which 
sells pastry mixes and restaurant equipment to franchisees . 
Over the years, Krispy Kreme has developed something of a cult following, with patrons 
waiting hours to be the first customers at newly opened stores. Devotees know that when 
a fresh batch ofKrispy Kreme's Original Glazed doughnuts is ready, stores light the "Hot 
Doughnuts Now" sign. It is taking its fame into new states and across the border into 
Canada, where it opened its first non-US location in late 2001 . Krispy Kreme is looking 
to nearly double in size over the next three years. Its franchises are bound by contract to 
open at least 200 new stores in that time, including about 60 in 2002. In 2002 the 
company paid $23 million to increase its stake in franchisee Glazed Investments LLC 
from 30% to 75%. Glazed Investments plans to open about 20 new stores in the Denver, 
Milwaukee, and Minneapolis areas through 2006. In early 2003 Krispy Kreme agreed to 
acquire Montana Mills, an operator of upscale cafes and baked shops in the Northeast, for 
about $40 million. 
Besides the US and Canada, Krispy Kreme is targeting Australia (where it signed 
franchise agreements in 2002), New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Spain, and the UK. In 
2002 Krispe Kreme was in talks with McDonald's Japan to sell Krispy Kreme doughnuts 
at the burger giant's locations in Japan. Also that year it partnered with Chesire and Kent 
Ltd. and Donald Henshall (previously Krispy Kreme's President of International 
Development, now Managing Director of the new enterprise) to form Krispy Kreme UK 
Limited, which will develop 25 stores in the UK through 2007. Krispy Kreme owns 34% 
ofKrispy Kreme UK . 
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The company sought vertical integration with its 2001 acquisition of Chicago-based 
coffee roaster Digital Java. It now looks to steal a page from the Starbucks playbook by 
expanding its beverage line to include espresso and frozen coffee drinks." (Hoovers.com 
03/13/03) 
Industry 
"Although Restaurant stocks have lost some of their zip in recent months, the group is 
still ranked in the top quintile of all industries reviewed by Value Line. While the nation's 
economy recovers at a tedious, often uneven, pace, we think it retains the necessary 
strength to provide a solid underpinning for restaurant sales in the months ahead, though 
a later Thanksgiving will alter the November-December sales comparisons. 
Sustaining profitability will take some doing on the part of restaurant managements, 
owing to the intense competitive climate, especially in the fast-food sector. The favorable 
food-cost environment, however, should remain a positive, at least for the short run. 
We advise Value Line subscribers to maintain a cautious and selective approach to 
investing in the Restaurant Industry. The primary focus should be on those chains that 
have proven customer appeal and the financial capacity to endure a difficult competitive 
environment." (Valueline.com 03/13/03) 
Past Performance 
The ratio analysis for KKD does not give us a clear picture of how to proceed. KKD has 
a high PE ratio, a high Price to Cash flow ratio, and a high Price to Book ratio. KKD 
does not offer a dividend, but it does show a positive trend in sales. KKD is not 
extremely leveraged and they do not have a great Margin, but their return on Equity is 
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solid. While the ratios do not show strong support for the purchase ofKKD, we believe 
the long term prospects for the company are strong. Those long term prospects as 
discussed below. 
Industry: Sector: 
Krispy Kreme (KKD) Company Restaurant Coff./Bake S&PSOO 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 55.53 21.1 22.74 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 42.82 11.48 14.42 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 7.42 3.90 3.18 4.09 
Dividend Yield N/A 1.37 2.82 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago 31.39 12.11 10.92 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.22 0.93 0.98 0.97 
EBITD Margin(TTM) 15.23 18.25 22.47 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 17.50 13.98 12.64 18.29 
Outlook 
The outlook for KKD is very good. Value line projects a same-store sales gain of 10% 
this next year. In October of last year KKD's earnings jumped 55% on strong margins. 
The company plans to double their 270 stores in the next three years, and Value line 
predicts they will have 750 stores in five years. Also, KKD is expanding internationally 
with a new franchise contract in the UK as well as Australia. KKD looks to be one of the 
few stars in the restaurant industry. This is a mid cap stock to go long in . 
Required Rate 
(CAPM) 11.83% 
Krispy Kreme 
Doughnuts, Inc. Growth (Dollar Present 
(KKD) Amount) FCF Value 
2003 15.00 (6.79) -6.071716 
2004 22.50 15.71 12.562022 
2005 33.75 49.46 35.365446 
2006 47.25 96.71 61.835529 
2007 66.15 162.86 93.115677 
Tenninal Value 6% 2963.596 1694.4446 
Present value of FCF $1,891.25 
2002 shares outstanding 54.3 
KKD Value of operations per share $ 34.84 
Nonoperating assets per share $ 0.28 
Debt per share $ 0.06 
Preferred Stock per share $ -
Valuation $ 35.06 
1 year Expected Return: 12.25% 
Recommendation: BUY 
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• 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Introduction 
Buy 
$19.49 (3/18/03) 
$12.21-$27.54 
Communication Services 
Growth 
$1.9 billion 
UTStarcom, Inc. provides communications equipment for service providers that operate 
wireless and wire line networks in rapidly growing communications markets. Its 
integrated suite of network access systems, optical transmission products, and subscriber 
terminal products allow service providers to offer scalable voice, data, and Internet access 
services. Approximately 90% of2001 sales were made in China. Acquired Advanced 
Communication Devices Corp., 11/01. Has about 800 employees and 205 stockholders. 
Softbank owns 31.6% of common; officers and directors, 12.2% (4/02 proxy). Chairman: 
Masayoshi Son. CEO and President: Hong Lu. Inc.: DE. Address: 1275 Harbor Bay 
Parkway, Alameda, CA 94502. Tel.: 510-864-8800. Internet: www.utstar.com. 
(ValueLine) 
Industry 
The outlook for the Telecommunications Equipment Industry continues to be poor. 
Nonetheless, nearly all the companies in the sector have experienced a rise from their all-
time low prices. But, while a number of the telecom equipment companies expect 
improved sales and earnings numbers in 2003, many, including industry leader Lucent 
Technologies, will probably see falling revenues, along with some reduction in operating 
losses. There is no indication yet of a change in the industry fundamentals. The autumn 
price bounce may reflect sector rotation or opportunistic buying of stocks at their all-time 
lows. (Valueline) 
Changes in telecommunications regulations, including new rules for wireless spectrum 
allocation, could stimulate telecom equipment sales. Some industry lobby groups are 
calling for a national broadband policy. But the government is showing no interest in 
building a broadband super highway. Instead, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) has been conducting an active and lengthy review of telecommunications policy. 
Regional Bell companies are lobbying vigorously to eliminate the requirement obligating 
them to provide broadband system access to their competitors that is part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. While FCC concerns over common carrier regulations 
and spectrum allocations may seem arcane, the decisions will be one of the forces 
shaping the future for the telecom equipment industry. The FCC's bias is clearly to 
maintain and encourage market competition. (Valueline) 
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Past Performance 
UTSI's PIE ratio is slightly above the communications industry average, yet still well 
below the average for the S&P as a whole. Given UTSI' s expected future growth rates, 
this appears to make UTSI very undervalued. UTSI also has a low P/B compared with 
the industry and the S&P as a whole, also indicating that UTSI may be undervalued. One 
reason for UTSI high book value lies in the fact that UTSI carries no debt, and maintains 
a substantial cash position for potential acquisitions. 
UTSI pays no dividends, but this is a reasonable payout ratio given UTSI expected 
growth rates. UTSI maintains a relatively healthy ROE. One disappointment with UTSI 
is the somewhat lower-than-expected EBITD margin, but this is expected to grow as 
UTSI matures as a company. 
Industry: 
Communications Sector: 
UTStarcom Inc (UTSI) Company Services Services S&PSOO 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 18.15 15.10 22.74 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 14.58 5.86 14.42 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 2.37 3.01 3.18 4.09 
Dividend Yield N/A 4.46 2.82 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr a2o 56.63 0.35 10.92 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.00 1.90 0.98 0.97 
EBITD Marl.!in(TTM) 15.11 31.55 22.47 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 14.68 7.76 12.64 18.29 
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Outlook 
We expect China's communication market (80% oftotal sales) to experience rapid 
growth for the next several years, driven by the government's commitment to developing 
a communications infrastructure. With a leading 60% market share in China's fixed 
mobility market, UTSI is best positioned to benefit from China's telecom growth. The 
stock is currently trading at 15X our 2003 EPS estimate of$1.29, a 50% discount to our 
projected three-year 30% annual EPS growth rate. We believe this discount is 
unwarranted, as UTSI has consistently met its EPS guidance in the 11 quarters it has been 
public. Moreover, our earnings estimates could see significant upward revisions as the 
company increases its exposure outside China. We would accumulate the shares, given 
UTSrs attractive end-market opportunity, earnings potential and relatively low valuation. 
(S&P) 
On March 13th, Utstarcom raised its Q1 and full year guidance for FY 2003 . It raised its 
Q1 sales estimate from $275 million to $315 million, and raised its EPS guidance from 
$0.23 to $0.27. It raised its full year sales estimate to $1.4 bullion from $1.325 billion, 
and raised EPS from $1.27 to $1.37. None ofUTStarcom's new forecasts reflects the 
pending acquisition of3Com Corp.'s CommWorks telecom equipment business. 
UTStarcom said on March 4 that it would buy that business for $100 million in cash, and 
the deal was expected to close within 120 days. 
While there is some concern about the dependence ofUSTI on Chinese sales, its strong 
earnings growth coupled with recent guidance increases indicates that UTSI is a strong 
investment. UTSI appears committed to diversifying away some of its risk with the 
Chinese, and we see this as a plus . 
42 
• 
• 
• 
Valuation method 
Current 5 year growth estimates for UTSI are currently around 70% per year. Given this 
estimate, we feel that the following growth rates in FCF are justified. 
Required 
UTStarcom ( UTSI) Rate (CAPM) 17.35% 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 60% 102.88 87.66937 
2004 50% 154.32 112.0614 
2005 40% 216.048 133.6906 
2006 30% 280.8624 148.1021 
2007 20% 337.0349 151 .4465 
Tenninal Value 8% 3893.023 1749.329 
Present value of 
FCF 2382.299 
Add non-op Assets 107.3 
Market Value of 
Finn 2489.599 
subtract pref. stock 0 
subtract debt 0 
Common Stock Equity 2489.599 
2002 shares outstanding 106.8 
UTSI Valuation $ 23.31 
1 Year Expected Returns: 25% 
We currently feel that UTSI is currently undervalued in the market, and that it will 
provide returns in excess of the CAPM required rate of return for investors. Given that 
the risk ofUTSI is high, we anticipate a high level of return in order to justly compensate 
investors for this risk. 
Recommendation: Buy 
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4) LeapFrog Enterprises Inc. (LF) 
Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Introduction (from Multex) 
BUY 
$24.50 (3/ 19/03) 
$13.00 - $35. 70 
Retail Toys and Electronics 
Mid-Cap Growth 
$1.28 billion 
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. is a designer, developer and marketer of technology-based 
educational products and related proprietary content. The Company designs its products 
to help preschool through eighth-grade children learn age- and skill-appropriate subject 
matter, including phonics, reading, math, spelling, science, geography, history and music. 
The Company is in the process of extending its product line to reach high school students 
as well. Leapfrog's product line includes platforms, which are portable, affordable 
hardware devices, content, such as interactive books and cartridges, specifically designed 
for use with its platforms and stand-alone educational products, primarily for children 
who are too young to use its platforms effectively. The Company's products are sold 
throughout the United States primarily by national and regional mass-market and 
specialty retailers and, to a lesser extent, into international markets and to United States 
schools . 
The Company operates three business segments, which it refers to as U.S. Consumer, 
Education and Training, and International. In the U.S. Consumer segment, which 
represented approximately 92% of total net sales in 2001, the Company markets and sells 
its products directly to national and regional mass-market and specialty retailers, as well 
as to other retail stores, through sales representatives. Its Education and Training segment, 
which includes the Company's SchoolHouse division, targets the school market in the 
United States, including sales directly to educational institutions, teacher supply stores 
and through catalogs aimed at educators. In its International segment, the Company sells 
its products outside the United States directly to overseas retailers and through various 
distribution and strategic arrangements. The Company has historically sold its products 
predominantly through the toy sections of major retailers. 
Industry 
Retail has struggled over the past 12 months as consumer confidence has continually 
trended downward. LeapFrog has not suffered like its competitors though as it has 
outperformed the industry since it went public last July . 
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Past Performance 
LeapFrog is a true growth company in terms of PIE and growth. Since going public less 
than a year ago, LeapFrog has a higher PIE, Price to Cash Flow, and Price to Book than 
its industry suggesting that it could potentially be overpriced. Sales growth however has 
been way above the rest of the industry as well as ROE. Also notable is the company's 
lack of debt. 
LeapFrog Enterprises (LF) Company Industry Sector S&PSOO 
PIE Ratio (TIM) 36.6 19.93 13.62 22.23 
!Price to Cash Flow (TIM) 19.8 15.4 9.2 15.62 
Price to Book (MRQ) 4.26 3.98 2.76 4.17 
Dividend Yield NA 0.82 3.01 2.33 
Sales (TIM) vs TIM 1 Yr. Ago 69.22 13.58 6.08 4.17 
Total Debt to Equity (MRQ) 0 0.39 0.93 0.98 
EBITD Margin (TIM) 15.04 17.75 11.04 20.21 
Return On Equity (TIM) 31.83 22.23 15.22 18.38 
Outlook 
LeapFrog should continue its current growth rates in the future due to new toys scheduled 
for future release. This is also in line with analyst earnings estimates of$1.03/share in 
2003 and $1.30 in 2004. This is up from $0.86 in 2002. Analysts also are predicting a 5-
year growth rate of25%. 
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Valuation 
A valuation of this stock was unable to be reached due to a beta for this stock being 
unavailable. 
Recommendation: BUY 
LeapFrog Enterprises is a solid company with a good product that is maintaining 
customer demand and market share in a competitive children' s toy industry. Its lack of 
debt leaves it with substantial resources to use to finance future growth . 
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Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Introduction 
BUY 
$55.20 (03126/03) 
$33.65-$61.90 
Motion Pictures 
Mid Cap Growth 
$2.5 billion 
"Pixar Animation Studios keeps computer-generating hits. Producer of the 1995 hit Toy 
Story (the first fully computer-animated feature film), its sequel Toy Story 2 (1999), and 
2001's Monsters, Inc., Pixar uses its proprietary software programs Marionette (modeling, 
animating, and lighting), Ringmaster (production management), and RenderMan (image 
rendering) to produce three-dimensional-looking animation. Pixar has partnered with 
Walt Disney Studios to co-create more animated features. Chairman and CEO Steve Jobs 
(a co-founder and CEO of Apple Computer) owns 60% of the company. 
Pixar also sells RenderMan to visual effects companies, which have used it to create 
some of the dinosaurs in Jurassic Park and new creatures in Star Wars: Episode I- The 
Phantom Menace. 
The release of A Bug's Life in 1998 was the fust in the 1 0-year, five-picture co-
production deal with Walt Disney Studios (Monsters, Inc., was the second). The two 
companies are splitting costs and profits 50-50, including merchandising, which can be 
staggering for an animated film . Pixar produces the films while Disney handles all 
marketing and distribution duties. Pixar still owes Disney three films under the deal, 
which will run at least through 2005. However, Pixar is already being courted by 
Disney's studio rivals such as Sony Pictures Entertainment and Warner Bros. 
Between Monsters, Inc., A Bug's Life, and two Toy Story films, Pixar has accounted for 
nearly a quarter of the animation box office in recent years." (Hoovers.com 03/13/03) 
Industry 
The motion picture industry is known as a high risk high reward type of business. The 
product, movies, are costly to make but can be overwhelmingly rewarding if the 
popularity of the movie soars. One good movie release with the accompanied proceeds 
from video and DVD sales can fund several sub par movies. 
The industry is very fickle because there is no formula on how to make a good selling 
movie. Considering all the advertising movies do, the real money is made when someone 
goes to see the movie, and they tell their friends about it. The whole industry is 
constantly trying to identify and satisfy the preferences of their customers . 
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As mentioned previously a major benefit for the movie industry is the ability to sell the 
video and DVD a couple of months after the movie is first released. This gives the 
company the ability to make more money on the same production costs. 
One major problem movie producer's face is a poor economy. The industry sells a 
luxury product that can be enjoyed only when it can be afforded. The current poor 
economy and the threat of war on the horizon has hampered the profits of all in the 
industry . 
Past Performance 
The Price ratios are above the industry standard, but not so high that they are a major 
concern for us. The sales trend and EBITD numbers are phenomenal, and while the ROE 
is good, it could be improved by adding some leverage to the company. 
In PIXR's case the ratios don't tell us the whole story. Some of the numbers suggest we 
should be concerned about a purchase ofPIXR, while others suggest we should run out 
and buy shares immediately. Because of this disparity, we need to look more at the 
outlook of the company . 
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Sector: 
Pixar Animation Industry: Motion 
Studios (PIXR) Company Entertainment Pictures S&PSOO 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 31.58 30.70 22.74 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 31.45 20.92 14.42 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 3.87 1.41 3.18 4.09 
Dividend Yield N/A 3.14 2.82 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago 187.26 14.02 10.92 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.00 0.16 0.98 0.97 
EBITD Mar2io(TTM) 69.74 20.88 22.47 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 15.40 4.43 12.64 18.29 
Outlook 
PIXR has been a successful movie producer as shown in their releases of Toy Story and 
Monsters, Inc. We like the prospects for the future ofPIXR. They have taken steps to 
smooth out their revenue streams with planned releases of Finding Nemo this year and 
two more movie releases in 2004 and 2005. Upon completion of those releases in 2005 
their agreement with Disney for 5 films will conclude, and PIXR will in effect become a 
free agent. And they are already being recruited by Sony Pictures and Warner Bros. The 
future for PIXR looks very good . 
Pixar Animation Required 
(PIXR) Rate (CAPM) 10.85% 
Present 
Growth oro FCF Value 
2003 18% 108.442 97.8277 
2004 18% 127.9616 104.1377 
2005 18% 150.9946 110.8548 
2006 14% 172.1339 114.0049 
2007 14% 196.2326 117.2446 
Tenninal Value 6% 4288.796 2562.459 
Present value of 
FCF 3106.528 
2002 shares outstanding 49.4 
PIXR Value of operations per share $ 62.89 
Nonoperating assets per share $ 4.49 
Debt per share $ 
-
Preferred Stock per share $ -
Valuation $ 67.38 
1 year Expected Return: 11.50% 
Recommendation: BUY 
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Section 3: 
Analyst Recommendations for Middle 
Capitalization Value Stocks 
-------, 
Mid Cap Value Screen 
Market Cap 
I 
$1 - $8 billion 
;FIE 
i 
1-15 
IP/B <2 
IDiv. Yield >3% 
J1 yr. EPS growth >1% 
11 yr. Rev growth >1% 
j1 yr. Inc. growth >1% 
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Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Introduction 
Buy 
$30.13 (3/ 18/03) 
$28.25-$40.60 
Specialty Chemicals 
Value 
$4.15 billion 
Ciba Specialty Chemicals helps things-- plastics, coatings, fabrics, consumer products--
last longer, work better, and look more colorful. The company produces specialty 
chemicals through five business segments: coating effects (pigments, anti-static and anti-
corrosion additives, and whitening agents); plastic additives (additives for lubricants and 
plastics); textile effects (dyes and brighteners); water and paper treatment (products for 
paper production and water and wastewater treatment); and home and personal care 
(whiteners for detergents, antimicrobials, and UV absorbers for sunscreens). Ciba sells in 
roughly 120 countries, mostly in Europe, the Americas, and the Asia-Pacific region. 
Like many others in the beleaguered chemical industry, Ciba has restructured. In 2001 
the company reorganized its segments around its customer markets. Except for home and 
personal care products (about 5% of sales), its segments are pretty evenly balanced; each 
accounts for 20%-27% of sales. Geographically, Europe and the Americas account for 
almost 75% of sales. 
Ciba has experienced steady growth in all sectors but textile effects, which has been hurt 
because textile producers have moved from the company's traditional US and European 
markets to Asia. However, the company has been adding capacity in Asia to benefit from 
that region's growing demand. (China is now CIBA's third largest market after Germany 
and the US.) (Hoovers) 
Industry 
In general, the firms that compose this industry provide original equipment makers 
(OEMs) with value-added products that are used as an input in a final good. Most take a 
basic, commodity chemical and process it to alter its performance characteristics. 
Because the modified chemistries tend to be formulated for specific uses, and in some 
cases specific customers, alternative applications are limited. For this reason, the 
specialty chemical markets have evolved into fragmented niches. 
Specialty chemical producers operate in nearly every sector of the economy, running the 
gamut from agriculture to technology. As such, profit prospects tend to be tied to activity 
levels in the specific end-market served. That said, broader macroeconomic indicators, 
factory orders and industrial production in particular, can still be useful in divining sales 
trends and expectations. 
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Seasonally adjusted data for total manufacturing orders and output affirm that domestic 
factory activity stalled in June of2000, then declined steadily for more than a year until 
the Federal Reserve's aggressive rate-cutting campaign last fall took hold. For perspective, 
the difference between peak and trough in new orders represented a near 20% swing. And 
the slope of the recovery over the past several quarters has been gentle, to say the least. 
Reduced business investment has been the primary catalyst of the weakness in the 
industrial markets. Indeed, low interest rates have induced households to continue 
spending freely throughout, either by taking on new debt or by extracting home equity 
through a mortgage refinancing. Specialty chemical volume patterns reflect this 
dichotomy, with those supplying consumer-goods manufacturers faring better than those 
whose clients produce goods for businesses. (Value Line) 
Past Performance 
CSB' s ratios are indicative of a pure value play. Its PIE ratio is significantly below 
industry and sector averages. However, its price to cash flow is more in line with 
industry peers, which may mean that CSB is managing earnings less aggressively than 
competitors. CSB has an extremely low price to book, also indicative of a pure value 
play. 
Some negatives with CSB are its lack of dividend, its declining sales from last year, and 
its relatively low ROW and EBITD. However, with the exception of the dividend policy, 
the ratios are close enough to industry averages as to not cause significant concern . 
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Industry: Sector: 
CmA Specialty Chemicals Chemical Basic 
(CSB) Company Manufacturin2 Materials S&P500 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 13.49 21.03 28.42 21.78 
Price To Casb Flow 12.13 11.86 11 .24 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 1.27 2.72 2.76 4.09 
Dividend Yield N/A 2.45 3.05 2.33 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr a2o -3 .83 0.77 3.39 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.88 0.99 1.20 0.97 
EBITD Margin(TTM) 11.59 16.80 14.47 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 9.74 12.40 9.21 18.29 
Outlook 
On March 6th, 2003, CSB reiterated medium-term goals of sales growth averaging 6% a 
year until2005, an EBIIDA margin of20% and a free cash flow ofCHFl billion in 2005 . 
Current consensus 5 year growth estimates are for 7% growth per year. While this 
growth rate is below the average for the S&P 500, given CSB's relatively low required 
rate of return due to a low beta, we feel that CSB is undervalued at this time. Given these 
expected growth rates for CSB, we currently believe that it is undervalued. As business 
spending begins to pick up in the latter half of 2003 or 2004, we feel that CSB will be 
poised for future growth. CSB is, however, based in Switzerland, and trades on the 
NYSE as an ADR. CSB does sell the majority of its products to the US and to Europe, 
and the foreign exposure is not expected significantly increase the risk of the CSB. CSB 
has recently increased cash holdings by a significant amount, and this should be 
monitored in future years . 
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Valuation method 
Current 5 year growth estimates for CSB are currently around 7% per year. Given this 
estimate, we feel that the following growth rates in FCF are justified. 
CIBA Specialty Required 
Chemicals (CSB) Rate {CAPM) 6.95o/o 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 1.0% 491.87 459.9065 
2004 1.0% 496.7887 434.3203 
2005 1.0% 501 .7566 410.1576 
2006 1.0% 506.7742 387.3391 
2007 1.0% 511 .8419 365.79 
Terminal Value 1.0% 8688.409 6209.209 
Present value of 
FCF 8266.723 
Add non-op Assets 1065.6 
Market Value of 
Firm 9332.323 
subtract pref. stock 0 
subtract debt 2739 
Common Stock Equity 6593.323 
2002 shares outstanding 137.9 
CSB Valuation $ 47.81 
1 Year Expected Return: 12% 
We feel that CSB is currently undervalued, and that its future returns will outperform the 
CAPM required rate of return by a wide margin. 
Recommendation: Buy 
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Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Introduction 
BUY 
$8.70 (3/18/03) 
$6.63-$9.37 
Real Estate Operations 
Value 
$1.12 billion 
BUSINESS: This real estate investment trust (REIT) pared down its name and its focus. 
The former Health and Retirement Properties Trust abbreviated its name and portfolio 
when it spun off Senior Housing Properties Trust, which invests in assisted-living 
facilities; HRPT owns about 30% of the trust. The firm focuses now on commercial real 
estate. The REIT owns 190 office properties (about 60% in central business districts) in 
27 states and Washington, DC; more than half are in Massachusetts, Texas, Pennsylvania, 
and California. Leases to the US government account for nearly 20% of revenue. HRPT 
trustees Gerard Martin and Barry Portnoy own REIT Management & Research, the 
company that manages the REIT's operations. (Hoovers) 
Industry 
The Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) sector performed relatively well in 2002. The 
Morgan Stanley REIT Index posted slightly positive returns, year over year. This easily 
beat the performance of the Standard and Poors and Nasdaq indexes, which have posted 
declines in 2002 of about 23% and 32%, respectively. 
REIT fundamentals remain a bit mixed. Problems in the overall economy have hurt 
results in many sectors of the industry, particularly in the third quarter. We have reduced 
our estimates for earnings and Funds From Operation (FFO) for 2003 and 2004, in many 
cases, and it appears that with the price gains many REIT stocks have made in the last 
year, this sector as a whole is no longer selling at a large discount. 
Many of the office REIT' s are being hurt by lower occupancy rates, which we currently 
estimate at about 85% for the sector on average. In response to greater available space, 
rental rates are also declining. In many cases, new leases are being signed at a discount to 
expiring leases, and landlords are offering increased incentives to attract new tenants. 
Results are being bolstered a bit by early lease termination fees, which boosts revenue in 
the short term, but results in future occupancy problems. 
The recently proposed legislation exempting dividends from taxation won't apply to 
REITs. This is not surprising, since the aim of the legislation is to avoid double taxation. 
Since most REITs don't pay taxes on the corporate level, investors likely will have to 
continue paying taxes on distributions. 
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The year ahead will likely be difficult for most REITs. However, in most cases, dividend 
payouts remain a reasonable percentage ofFFO (usually about 65%-80%) and will likely 
be sustainable, even ifFFO and earnings growth decelerate a bit. lfREIT stocks decline 
in price, this should provide investors with an opportunity to buy REITs at more 
attractive multiples. Most investors should stick with the larger more diversified 
companies, and consider these investments for their potential total return. (V alueline) 
Past Performance 
Initial ratio valuations seem to indicate that HRP may be undervalued. PIE ratios, P/B 
ratios, and price to cash flows are all significantly below industry averages. In addition, 
the dividend yield is significantly above industry averages, and HRP carries significantly 
less debt than its industry competitors 
However, HRP has a slightly lower EBITD than its industry competitors, and a 
significantly lower ROE. The ROE is low enough to cause some initial concern, but if 
the current dividend payout ratio can be maintained, which looks likely given debt ratios, 
then HRP seems that it may be a good value . 
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Industry: 
Real Estate Sector: 
HRTP Properties Trust (HRP) Company Operations Services S&PSOO 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 13.35 21.04 23.03 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 7.29 9.58 14.74 15.62 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 0.77 1.73 3.23 4.09 
Dividend Yield 9.34 7.75 2.78 2.33 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago 5.78 13.23 10.85 4.11 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 0.63 1.67 0.98 0.98 
EBITD Margin(TTM) 59.37 61.61 22.63 19.56 
Return On Equity (TTM) 5.69 8.98 12.85 18.29 
Outlook 
HRP expects to selectively pursue acquisitions and dispositions; however, no specific 
amounts of property acquisitions or sales have been established. The occupancy rate at 
December 31, 2002, was 92.1%, up from 91.8% a year earlier. In July, the trust ftled with 
the SEC to allow the sale of some of its shareholdings in its former subsidiaries, Senior 
Housing Properties Trust (NYSE: SNH) and Hospitality Properties Trust (NYSE: HPT), 
as well as new HRP shares, to a new mutual fund to be organized by a subsidiary of 
REIT Management and Research LLC, the investment and property manager for HRP, 
SNH and HPT. (S&P) 
HRPs occupancy rates are increasing while other in the industry are seeing decreases. 
HRPs hefty dividend appears to be relatively safe, as payout ratios are currently hovering 
around 62% of 2002 funds from operations, and 79% of funds from property operations . 
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Valuation method 
Current 5 year growth estimates for HRP are currently around 3.4% per year. Given this 
estimate, we feel that the following growth rates in FCF are justified. 
HRPT Properties Required 
Trust (HRP) Rate (CAPM) 5.65% 
Present 
Growth Ofo FCF Value 
2003 2.0% 89.964 85.15286 
2004 2.0% 91.76328 82.211 
2005 2.0% 93.59855 79.37077 
2006 2.0% 95.47052 76.62867 
2007 2.0% 97.37993 73.9813 
Terminal Value 2.0% 2721.302 2067.423 
Present value of 
FCF 2464.767 
Add non-op Assets 107.3 
Market Value of 
Firm 2572.067 
subtract pref. stock 0 
subtract debt 1216 
Common Stock Equity 1356.067 
2002 shares outstanding 128.8 
HRP Valuation $ 10.53 
1 Year Expected Return: 9.34% 
We feel that the expected return ofHR.P will closely match that of its dividend yield, with 
little to no capital appreciation. This is well in excess of its CAPM required rate of return. 
Recommendation: BUY 
58 
• 3) Aon Corporation (AOC) 
• 
• 
Recommendation: 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Introduction 
Buy 
$20.26 {03/26103) 
$13.30-$39.63 
Accident I Health Insurance 
Mid Cap Value 
$4.8 billion 
0 
"Aon, whose name means "oneness" in Gaelic, is the world's #2 insurance brokerage and 
consulting company (behind Marsh & McLennan). The firm operates in three major 
segments: commercial brokerage, consulting services, and consumer insurance 
underwriting. The company's brokerage operations include retail and wholesale insurance 
for groups and businesses, as well as reinsurance. Its consulting business specializes in 
employee benefits. AON's older but smaller insurance underwriting segment (including 
founder W. Clement Stone's original insurance underwriting business, Combined 
Insurance) offers supplementary health, accident, and life insurance and extended 
warranties for consumer goods. 
The segment's Combined Specialty Group offers extended consumer product warranties. 
Aon has announced plans to sell this business, scrapping plans to spin it off into a 
separately quoted company. 
In an attempt to reduce costs, Aon has moved administrative functions from local offices 
to processing centers. Expanding its insurance underwriting operations to include direct 
property/casualty insurance and reinsurance, Aon launched Endurance Specialty (co-
sponsored by Zurich Financial). 
Aon has teamed up with the Giuliani Group, former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani's 
consulting firm, to provide business risk assessment and crisis management services. 
Chairman and CEO Patrick Ryan owns about 12% of the company" (Hoovers. com 
3/12/03) 
Industry 
"In general, the economic data coming from industry sources point to some moderation in 
the months ahead. The government reports show that consumer credit remains sluggish 
and this does not augur well for the growth in loans. With high debt levels, consumers, 
collectively, may work to repair balance sheets in the meantime, which may prove a 
headwind to lenders. 
The mortgage market also seems to be cooling somewhat. Applications look to be 
cresting and refinancings, with their juicy up-front fees, will falloff if interest rates go 
higher. We find it troubling that foreclosure rates have reached multi-decade highs, while 
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problem loans never seemed to reach comparably high levels. While foreclosures may be 
a lagging effect, the credit enhancements taken by many large firms may be suppressing 
problem loans, reducing the warnings that this statistic would give investors. Therefore, 
another dose of caution is probably in order." (Valueline.com 3/12/03) 
Past Performance 
AOC's ratio analysis tells a very good story. They have a low PIE ratio, a low Price to 
Cash Flow ratio, and a low Price to Book ratio. Their dividend yield is high, and they 
have a positive sales trend. AOC's price to sales ratio is .55 and the industry average 
is .91. All of these are signals that the company is undervalued as compared to its 
industry. 
Industry: Sector: Ins. 
Aon Corp. (AOC) Company Financial & Senices S&P500 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 11.69 16.00 15.90 21.78 
Price To Cash Flow 7.70 13.18 14.23 16.23 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 1.40 3.84 2.15 4.09 
Dividend Yield 3.16 2.72 2.54 2.34 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr a2o 14.93 11.77 -4.79 4.11 
Outlook 
The outlook for AOC is pretty good for several reasons. The company itself is so 
diversified that the earnings are not dependent on one sector. Just as diversification in the 
portfolio creates a more stable and safe return, a diversified company gets the same 
results. As mentioned previously, the CEO owns 12% of the stock. We like for the CEO 
• to have a large stake in the outcome of the company, because it provides the right 
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incentive. While the company is strong, and probably undervalued, our main concern 
would be the industry. 
Aon Corporation Required 
(AOC) Rate (CAPM) 10.85% 
Present 
Growth 0Al FCF Value 
2003 13% 193.23 174.316644 
2004 13% 218.3499 177.697616 
2005 13% 246.7354 181.144165 
2006 11% 273.8763 181.389285 
2007 11% 304.0027 181.634738 
Tenninal Value 6% 6644.182 3969.74891 
Present value of 
FCF 4865.93136 
2002 shares outstanding 269.2 
AOC Value of operations per share $ 18.08 
Nonoperating assets per share $ 11.05 
Debt per share $ 6.29 
Preferred Stock per share $ 0.19 
Valuation $ 22.65 
1 year Expected Return: 11.00% 
Recommendation: BUY 
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• 
Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Introduction: 
$26.80 (3/27/03) 
$19.00- $39.94 
Hotel and Motels 
Mid-cap Value 
$4. 7 billion 
0 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. (Starwood), incorporated in 1980, is a hotel 
and leisure company. The Company conducts its hotel and leisure business both directly 
and through its subsidiaries. The Company's brand names include St. Regis, The Luxury 
Collection, Sheraton, Westin, Wand Four Points by Sheraton. Through these brands, 
Starwood is well represented in most major markets around the world. Starwood's 
revenue and earnings are derived primarily from hotel and leisure operations, which 
include the operation of the Company's owned hotels; management fees earned from 
hotels it manages pursuant to long-term management contracts; the receipt of franchise 
fees; and the development, ownership and operation of vacation ownership resorts, 
marketing and selling vacation ownership interests (VOis) in the resorts and providing 
financing to customers that purchase such interests (Multex). 
The Company's hotel and leisure business emphasizes the global operation of hotels and 
resorts primarily in the luxury and upscale segment of the lodging industry. Starwood 
seeks to acquire interests in or management rights with respect to properties in this 
segment. At December 31, 2001, the Company's portfolio included owned, managed and 
franchised hotels totaling 743 hotels with approximately 224,000 rooms in over 80 
countries and 15 vacation ownership resorts, all in the United States. The hotel portfolio 
is comprised of 165 hotels that Starwood owns or leases or in which Starwood has a 
majority equity interest (substantially all ofwhich hotels Starwood also manages), 265 
hotels managed by Starwood on behalf of third-party owners (including entities in which 
Starwood has a minority equity interest) and 313 hotels for which Starwood receives 
franchise fees (Multex). 
Industry: 
Almost every stock in the Hotel/Gaming Industry has lost some market value 
recently. Most of the decline can be attributed to the increased tension in the Middle East. 
The growing fears ofterrorist attacks on the United States, the possibility of a U.S.-led 
coalition against Iraq, and higher oil prices have weighed heavily on consumer 
confidence. As such, consumers have been more frugal in their spending. This more 
conservative stance has weakened an already soft US. economy. While we expected 
earnings at lodging companies to be hurt by a slowdown in consumer spending (room 
demand tends to follow the state of the general economy), the decline in profits of casino 
operators was somewhat surprising. Although garners tend to be the exception to the rule 
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(casino players usually frequent the tables regardless ofthe economic environment), it 
appears that the threat of war has made them think twice about their discretionary 
spending (Value Line). 
Soft economic conditions are expected to impede the return of the independent 
business traveler, which will probably put pressure on room rates. The conflict in the 
Middle East has caused a shortening of the booking cycle. As a result, visibility for the 
rest of 2003 is cloudy. Although the entire lodging sector will likely feel the ill effects of 
a war with Iraq, hoteliers with a significant international presence (Starwood Hotels) 
would probably be hurt the most. As a result, we expect revenue per available room to 
come in either flat or slightly down from 2002's figures for the full-service lodgers 
(Hilton Hotels, Marriott International, and Starwood) under our review (Value Line). 
The extended-stay hotels face even tougher times. These companies rely on 
consultants and training groups for most of their revenues. These hotels tend to lose out 
on the leisure traveler because ofthe lack of amenities and convention space at their 
properties. Moreover, extended-stays tend to lag a turnaround in the lodging industry, 
which typically starts with the transient business traveler tripper. As a result, Extended 
Stay America will likely trail its full-service peers in the year ahead (Value Line) . 
Past Performance 
The HOT Company has a PIE ratio lower than the S&P and its sector, thus the value 
designation. It has been pretty beat up lately, due to Macroeconomic factors affecting 
this sector. It pays a healthy dividend for the industry, but the slow dawn in sales is 
evident in its sales growth. This is not the best stock on paper for the current period, 
however, in the next two to five years, as the economy rebounds, war and global 
instability issues are settled, and people begin to travel again, the first dollars to flow will 
come to HOT. This is a long term play and be judged accordingly. 
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Industry: Sector: 
Stanvood Hotels (HOT) Company Lodging Hotels S&P500 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 19.71 16.74 23.03 22.23 
Price To Cash Flow 7.65 8.12 14.74 15.62 
Price To Book Ratio tMK0) 1.17 1.54 3.23 4.17 
Dividend Yield 3.55 1.64 2.78 2.33 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr a20 1.61 22.83 10.85 4.17 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 1.32 1.54 0.98 0.98 
EBITD Ma11!in(TTM) 22.74 25.21 22.63 20.21 
Return On Equity (TTM) 6.32 10.35 12.85 18.38 
Outlook 
I believe this stock will be relatively flat or decline slightly in the next 12- 18 months, 
but in 2005, it will begin to rise and recover strongly as tourism and the general economy 
rebound. This should be viewed as a long-term holding, not a short-term momentum 
stock. It is in our opinion that value stocks are often profited from when viewed from a 
contrarian's point of view. Thus our current stance on Starwood: A company with great 
fundamentals in a down market, in a down economy, with tremendous macroeconomic 
turmoil, near the bottom of its price range .... looking at growing in the future . 
Starwood Hotels Required 
(HOT) Rate (CAPM) 8 .25°.tb 
Present 
Growth% FCF Value 
2003 6.0% 499.26 461 .2102 
2004 6.0% 529.2156 451 .6238 
2005 6.0% 560.9685 442.2367 
2006 6.0% 594.6266 433.0447 
2007 6.0% 630.3042 424.0438 
Tenninal Value 3.0% 12365.97 8319.335 
Present value of 
FCF 10531.49 
Add non-op Assets 107.3 
Market Value of 
Finn 10638.79 
subtract pref. stock 51 
subtract debt 4672 
Common Stock Equity 5915.795 
2002 shares outstanding 199.7 
HOT Valuation $ 29.62 
HOT is expected to grow at or near 10%, thus we feel the cash flow figures accurately 
reflect this growth, and the expected return with a 3% dividend yield is 13.5%. 
Recommendation: Buy 
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Current price: 
52 week high and low: 
Industry: 
Style: 
Market Cap: 
Current Number of Shares: 
Introduction 
$16. 65(3/27 /03) 
$12.70-$24.13 
Leisure and Recreation Services 
Mid-Cap Value 
$2. 6 Billion 
0 
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., incorporated in 1985, is the parent company ofRoyal 
Caribbean International, the world's second largest cruise company with 22 cruise ships 
having 45,854 berths. The Company operates its cruise ships through two cruise brands: 
Royal Caribbean International and Celebrity Cruises. The Company's brands offer a wide 
array of shipboard activities, services and amenities, including swimming pools, sun 
decks, beauty salons, exercise and massage facilities, ice skating rinks, rock climbing 
walls, gaming facilities, lounges, bars, show-time entertainment, retail shopping and 
cinemas. The Company's ships operate on a selection of worldwide itineraries that call on 
approximately 200 destinations (Multex). 
Industry 
Although we look for sales and earnings of recreation companies to continue to 
recover, albeit gradually, our estimates are rather tenuous at this juncture. This primarily 
reflects a continued uncertain economic recovery. For example, initial indications were 
that growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was less than I% on a annualized basis 
during the December quarter of 2002. Furthermore, we don't look for a whole lot of 
upside in the March interim, although a 2% improvement in GDP appears within reach. 
Additionally, the significant threat of war with Iraq adds a good amount of uncertainty to 
the corporate earnings picture. This particularly holds true for recreation-oriented 
companies, as their products are not viewed as essential (Value Line). 
Other factors that make us cautious in our view are high unemployment, increased 
consumer debt levels, and waning consumer confidence. Indeed, a high level of consumer 
spending has kept the economy above water up to this point, as corporate expenditures 
have declined considerably. A reversal in this trend would significantly hurt the prospects 
of the recreation companies in the year ahead (ValueLine) . 
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Past Performance 
This company has a nice dividend yield considering its current low PIE. The stock price 
has been soundly trounced by a decrease in revenues and earnings resulting from a drop 
in Tourism. The cruise lines have been cutting prices in an attempt to gain more 
occupancy since the drop in the economy, 9/11, and the terrible cruise liner flu that was 
going around in late 2002. Consequently, revenues and margins have been down. There 
has been a minor recovery as of recent, and the table below depicts sales as not totally 
"dead in the water", but growing at nearly 10%. 
Royal Caribbean Cruise Industry: Sector: 
(RCL) Company Recreation Cruise S&P500 
PIE Ratio (TTM) 7.77 13.99 23.03 22.23 
Price To Cash Flow 4.48 8.85 14.74 15.62 
Price To Book Ratio (MRQ) 0.67 1.79 3.23 4.17 
Dividend Yield 3.71 2.23 2.78 2.33 
Sales (TTM) vs. TTM 1 yr ago 9.19 3.86 10.85 4.17 
Total Debt To Equity (MRQ) 1.36 0.62 0.98 0.98 
EBITD Margin(TTM) 25.35 27.96 22.63 20.21 
Return On Equity (TTM) 9.11 12.08 12.85 18.38 
Outlook 
This stock should be considered a long-term holding. It should be viewed as a 
turnaround bet, and a cheap buy. This company needs the economy to rebound and 
subsequently needs the demand for travel to increase. People need to feel that they have 
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disposable income available to them once again. When that occurs, the revenues on this 
firm will rise and margins will increase. 
Royal Caribbean Required 
Cruise Lines (RCL) Rate (CAPM) 13.00°k 
Present 
Growth 0k FCF Value 
2003 1.0% 1286.471 1138.52 
2004 1.0% 1299.335 1017.66 
2005 1.0% 1312.329 909.6304 
2006 1.0% 1325.452 813.0684 
2007 1.0% 1338.707 726.757 
Terminal Value 1.0% 11272.14 6119.422 
Present value of 
FCF 10725.06 
Add non-op Assets 0 
Market Value of 
Firm 10725.06 
subtract pref. stock 0 
subtract debt 5551 .6 
Common Stock Equity 5173.458 
2002 shares outstanding 195.2 
RCL Valuation $ 26.50 
The expected return for RCL including a 3.1% dividend yield is 62.3% . 
Recommendation: Buy 
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Capitalization Mutual Funds 
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;style Small Blend 
~xpense Ratio <2.1% 
1Morningstar Ratings 4 or 5 stars 
!Accepts new yes 
~nvestments 
i 
11 year returns > category 
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1) DLB Small Company Opportunities- Small Growth 
-DLBMX 
Morningstar rating: *****Five Star 
NAY: $11.48 
Net Assets: $310.91 million 
Introduction: 
DLB Small Company Opportunities Fund seeks long-term capital growth. The fund 
normally invests at least 65% of assets in common stocks. It typically invests in small 
companies with market capitalizations $10 million and $250 million. The fund may also 
invest in high-quality short-term debt obligations such as treasury bills, commercial paper, 
and repurchase agreements. "This fund is non-diversified." 
Past Performance: 
Sector Weights: 
Financial Services 22.98 
Industrial Materials 20.69 
Healthcare 15.4 
Hardware 10.7 
Business Services 8.08 
Energy 7.68 
Consumer Services 4.48 
Media 4.44 
Software 1.93 
Consumer Goods 1.81 
Utilities 1.77 
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Top 25 Holdings: 
Ticker Company Name % Net Assets YTD Return 
SGA Saga Comms 2.59% -9.47% 
GRMN Garmin 2.56% 12.73% 
PRX Pharmaceutical Resources 2.47% 21.31% 
MRR Mid-Atlantic Realty Tr 2.46% 0.64% 
ARB Arbitron 2.34% -7.46% 
EV Eaton Vance 2.30% -7.70% 
FESX First Essex Bancorp 2.27% -1 .50% 
COHR Coherent 2.23% -3.01% 
DNEX Dionex 2.14% 12.81% 
TNL Technitrol 1.96% -4.52% 
ACTL Actel 1.90% -0.86% 
IIVI II-VI 1.84% 11.64% 
WBST Webster Finl 1.84% 2.84% 
RDC Rowan 1.82% -12.56% 
STL Sterling Bancorp 1.74% -2.74% 
STC Stewart Info SVcs 1.74% 7.53% 
KNGT Knight Transp 1.62% -8.52% 
LYTS LSIInds 1.62% -26.84% 
IRGI lnveresk Rsrch Grp 1.59% -19.84% 
• 
NA Gray Television 1.52% NA 
TDW Tidewater 1.44% -1 .37% 
ATAC Aftermarket Tech 1.43% -25.38% 
PHHM Palm Harbor Homes 1.42% -0.86% 
TARO Taro Pharma lnds 1.41% -4.36% 
PlaY Philadelphia Consolid Hldg 1.38% -9.94% 
Total number of holdings 72 
%Assets in top 10 holdings 23.32 
Turnover(%) 115 
Valuation Measures: 
!Investment Valuation I Stock Portfolio j category 
!Price/Book 2.69 2.37 
!Price/Earnings 22.97 20.74 
IPrice/Cash Flow 15.30 11.36 
.Price/Sales 2.24 1.92 
• 
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Management: 
The fund has been managed by Robert Baumbach since 1999. Baumbach is a managing 
director and portfolio manager with David L. Babson & Company, his employer since 
November 1999. Prior he spent five years as senior vice president with Putnam 
Investments. He has over 15 years of investment experience and is a Chartered Financial 
Analyst. He received his BA from Towson State in 1982 and his MS in 1985 from the 
University ofBaltimore. 
Fees and Expenses: 
Total Expense Ratio 
Maximum Sales Fees 
Initial 
Deferred 
Redemption 
1.19% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
Maximum Other Fees 
Administrative 
Management 
12b-1 
NA 
1.00% 
0.25% 
Recommendation: DLB Small Company has consistently beaten its category averages 
and is rated a five-star fund by Morningstar. It also has low expenses. Weaknesses are 
high turnover and a higher than category average PIE ratio . 
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2) Bridgeway Ultra-Small - Small Blend - BRUSX 
Morningstar rating: *****Five Star 
NAV: $11.77 
Net Assets: $57.30 Million 
Introduction: 
Bridgeway Ultra-Small Company Portfolio seeks total return. The fund ordinarily invests 
at least 80% of assets in companies that fall within the smallest 10% of companies on the 
New York Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalization. As ofDec. 31, 1997, this 
included companies with less than $122 million in market capitalization. The fund's 
investments consist primarily of common stocks, but may also include convertible 
securities, warrants, and high-quality debt securities. The fund may invest up to 5% of 
assets in securities of companies that have been in operation for less than three years. It 
may invest up to 10% of assets in foreign securities, including American depositary 
receipts. 
Past Performance: 
Sector Weights: 
Financial Services 23.24 
Consumer Services 18.63 
Business Services 14.22 
Health care 13.23 
Consumer Goods 8.02 
Software 6.8 
Industrial Materials 6.24 
Energy 6.03 
Hardware 2.94 
Utilities 0.6 
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Top 25 Holdings: 
%Net 
Ticker Company Name Assets YTD Return 
FCN FTI Consult 6.38% 8.52% 
JOSB Jos A Bk Clothiers 3.67% 7.27% 
MWRK Mothers Work 3.52% -12.92% 
BPRX Bradley Pharmaceuticals Cl A 3.12% -4.22% 
HWL Howell 2.78% 122.04% 
DOCC Docucorp Inti 2.73% -37.62% 
STTX Steel Tech 2.72% -38.10% 
CEDC Central European Distr 2 .60% 36.68% 
OZRK Bank of the Oza!Ks 2.35% 16.06% 
SMD Singing Machine 2.11% -33.89% 
MTH Meritage 2.10% -6.39% 
BYS Bay State Bancorp 1.90% -1.70% 
FWHT FindWhat.com 1.65% 2.00% 
ANFI American Natl Finl 1.63% 1.22% 
TENT Total Entrtnmt Rest 1.61% -1 .19% 
HTRN Healthtronics 1.49% 11.35% 
SYNO Synovis Life Technologies 1.47% 10.11% 
RINO Blue Rhino 1.44% -46.23% 
• 
OTFC Oregon Trail Finl 1.43% 8.62% 
WSBI Warwick Cmnty Bancorp 1.25% 6.66% 
MOVI Movie Gallery 1.25% 13.62% 
HITK Hi-Tech Pharmacal 1.22% -23.68% 
CRMT America's Car-Mart 1.17% -8 .16% 
AIRM Air Methods 1.11% -0.02% 
NUTR Nutraceutical Inti 1.08% -21 .32% 
Total number of holdings 141 
%Assets in top 10 holdings 31.98 
Turnover(%) 121 
Valuation Measures: 
!Investment Valuation Stock Portfolio category 
!Price/Book 2.82 2.37 
)Price/Earnings 15.58 20.74 
!Price/Cash Flow 12.51 11.36 
. 
jPrice/Sales 1.661 1.92 
• 
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Management: 
John Montgomery has managed the fund since its inception in 1994. He is president and 
portfolio manager with Bridgeway Capital Management, a company he founded in 1993. 
Previously, he worked as a research engineer on the staff at MIT, and as an executive 
with transportation agencies in North Carolina and Texas. Montgomery is a member of 
the Social Investment Forum. He was born October 17, 1955 in Dallas. 
Fees and Expenses: 
Total Expense Ratio 
Maximum Sales Fees 
Initial 
Deferred 
Redemption 
1.26% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
Maximum Other Fees 
Administrative 
Management 
12b-1 
NA 
1.60% 
0.00% 
Recommendation: Bridgeway Ultra-Small is a five-star fund rated by Morningstar and 
characterized by its high returns and low expenses. Weaknesses are in its high turnover, 
high risk, and the percentage of the fund's assets contained in the top 1 0 holdings . 
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3) Credit Suisse Small Cap Value- Small Blend -
CCPCX 
Morningstar rating: *****Five Star 
NAV: $15.56 
Net Assets: $4.5 Million 
Introduction: 
Credit Suisse Small Cap Value Fund seeks capital growth. The fund normally invests at 
least 65% of assets in equities of companies with market capitalizations of $2 billion or 
less. It may also invest in securities convertible into common stock, preferred stock, 
investment-grade debt securities, U.S. government securities, municipal securities, 
money market instruments and other financial instruments. The fund may also invest up 
to 20% of assets in foreign securities. Currently, the fund is 95% invested in stocks. 
Past Performance: 
Sector Weights: 
Financial Services 26.09 
Industrial Materials 24.47 
Business Services 11.4 
Consumer Goods 9.05 
Health care 7.35 
Hardware 5. 12 
Energy 4.51 
Consumer Services 4.14 
Utilities 3.88 
Media 2.07 
Software 1.87 
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Top 25 Holdings: 
%Net 
Ticker Company Name Assets YTD Return 
LANC Lancaster Colony 2.64% -3.38% 
SXT Sensient Tech 2.40% -7.12% 
HU Hudson United Bancorp 2.36% 3.81% 
FULL HB Fuller 2.18% -13.72% 
on Oceaneering Inti 2.17% -6.02% 
AME Ametek 2.14% -14.71% 
GGG Graco 2.13% -6.60% 
VRC Varco Inti 2.11% 7.59% 
WBST Webster Finl 2.08% 2.84% 
ATR AptarGroup 2.05% -3.17% 
ASBC Associated Bane-Corp 2.04% 2.55% 
VARI Varian 2.00% 2.30% 
nns Harte-Hanks Comms 1.97% -1.71% 
ARRO Arrow Inti 1.97% 0.17% 
ESIO Electro Scientific lnds 1.94% -14.95% 
WGL WGLHidgs 1.93% 7.47% 
BN Banta 1.86% -9.04% 
FED Firstfed Finl 1.85% 4.08% 
• 
ROG Rogers 1.80% 24.85% 
PRGS Progress Software 1.78% 18.92% 
NFG Natl Fuel Gas 1.76% -6.03% 
MTW Manitowoc 1.72% -30.00% 
FFCH First Fin! Hldgs 1.70% -0.10% 
EME EmcorGrp 1.70% -9.17% 
FMER FirstMerit 1.67% -6.33% 
Total number of holdings 63 
%Assets in top 10 holdings 22.26 
Turnover(%) 54 
Valuation Measures: 
!Investment Valuation Stock Portfolio Category 
[Price/Book 2.10 2.37 
!Price/Earnings 19.51 20.74 
I 
JPrice/Cash Flow 9.44 11 .36 
]Price/Sales 1.48 1.921 
• 
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Management: 
This fund is managed by a management team, no data is available on team members. 
Fees and Expenses: 
Total Expense Ratio 
Maximum Sales Fees 
Initial 
Deferred 
Redemption 
2.08% 
0.00% 
1.00% 
0.00% 
Maximum Other Fees 
Administrative 
Management 
12tr1 
NA 
0.81% 
0.75% 
Recommendation: Credit Suisse Small Cap is a five-star fund rated by Morningstar. IT 
is characterized by low risk and high return. Though it posted losses, it beat its category 
soundly in 2002.Weaknesses are in the funds brief history, its slightly higher expenses 
and that it has yet to show significant gains . 
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4) Victory Small Company- Small Blend- SSGSX 
Morningstar rating: * * * * Four Star 
NAV: $20.41 
Net Assets: $31.46 Million 
Introduction: 
Victory Small Company Opportunity Fund seeks long-term capital growth. The fund 
invests at least 80% of assets in common stocks of smaller companies that show the 
potential for high earnings growth in relation to their price-earnings ratio. It considers 
small companies to be those with market capitalization ofless than $1.2 billion. 
Past Performance: 
Sector Weights: 
Financial Services 28.49 
Industrial Materials 21.03 
Business Services 9.6 
Hardware 7.35 
Healthcare 6.85 
Consumer Goods 6.45 
Energy 6.41 
Consumer Services 5.97 
Utilities 3.62 
Telecommunications 1.76 
Media 1.3 
Software 1.11 
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Top 25 Holdings: 
Ticker Company Name % Net Assets YTD Return 
RGF R& GFinl 1.80% -3 .23% 
ALFA Alfa 1.69% -0.91% 
DFG Delphi Finl Grp 1.66% -2.71% 
PVH Phillips-Van Heusen 1.59% 3.37% 
BHE Benchmark Electncs 1.59% 18.95% 
EGN Energen 1.57% 4.77% 
PZZA Papa John's Inti 1.55% -16.35% 
MMS Maxim us 1.55% -18.58% 
UFPI Universal Forest Products 1.54% -19 66% 
JH John H Harland 1.54% 4.95% 
BED Bedford Prop Investors 1.52% -0.93% 
POG Patina Oil & Gas 1.51% 4.20% 
AVCT Avocent 1.50% 25.7~/o 
STFC State Auto Finl 1.47% 4.97% 
NEB New England Busn Svc 1.46% 4 .95% 
INTL Inter-Tel 1.42% -18.84% 
SEH Spartech 1.42% -15.17% 
• 
IMN Imation 1.37% 1.82% 
FED Firstfed Finl 1.34% 4.08% 
FBC F1agstar Bancorp 1.32% 13.33% 
TBL Timberland 1.31% 7.47% 
AXE Anixter Inti 1.31% 0.47% 
PFB PFFBancorp 1.29% 2.62% 
ABM ABMinds 1.29% 4.50% 
US1R United Stationers 1.29% -26.99% 
Total number of holdings 99 
%Assets in top 10 holdings 16.08 
Turnover(%) 60 
Valuation Measures: 
!Investment Valuation Stock Portfolio' Category 
:Price/Book 1.85 2.37 
!Price/Earnings 17.90 20.74 
1Price/Cash Flow 7.60 11.36 
!Price/Sales 1.42 1.92 
• 
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Management: 
The fund is co-managed by Gary Miller and Steve Dilbone. Mr. Miller has managed the 
fund since March 1999 and been vice president and portfolio manager of Gradison 
McDonald Asset Management since June 1998, prior to which he served as a portfolio 
trader with Gradison McDonald since 1993. Mr. Diller has managed the fund since 
March 2002 and has been a trader and portfolio manager with the Gradison Division of 
McDonald & Company. Prior to joining the company in August 1990, he spent seven 
years with Merrill Lynch Capital Markets as an underwriter and trader. Dilbone is a 
Chartered Financial Analyst and a member of the Association for Investment 
Management and Research and the Queen City Bond Club. 
Fees and Expenses: 
Total Expense Ratio 1.09% 
Maximum Sales Fees 
Initial 
Deferred 
Redemption 
5.75% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
Maximum Other Fees 
Administrative 
Management 
12b-l 
0.15% 
0.65% 
0.00% 
Recommendation: Victory Small Company is a four star fund with low expenses that 
beat the category in 2002. Two weaknesses of the fund are its higher than average risk 
and that it has posted losses greater than the category so far in 2003 . 
80 
• 
• 
5) Loomis Sayles Small Cap- Small Blend- LSSCX 
Morningstar rating: ****Four Star 
NAY: $17.35 (3/18/03) 
Net Assets: $231.53 million 
Introduction: 
Loomis Sayles Small Cap Value Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation. The fund 
invests primarily in equity securities of companies with market capitalization that fall 
within the capitalization range of the Russell 2000 Index. It may invest the balance of 
assets in larger issuers. The fund emphasizes undervalued securities of companies with 
significant potential for growth. It may invest up to 20% of its assets in securities of 
foreign issuers, including emerging markets securities. 
Past Performance: 
Sector Weights: 
Financial Services 23.71 
Industrial Materials 16.04 
Business Services 13.06 
Consumer Goods 8.04 
Healthcare 7.67 
Hardware 5.96 
Energy 5.78 
Media 5.58 
Consumer Services 5.13 
Utilities 4.7 
Software 3.37 
Telecommunications 0.9 
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Top 25 Holdings: 
AMH AmerUs Grp 2.15% -6.69% 
RHD R. H. Donnelley 1.89% 5.32% 
PRGO Perrigo 1.67% -1 .93% 
GNWR Genesee & Wyoming Cl A 1.45% -23.93% 
JW.A John Wiley & Sons A 1.38% -4.54% 
PRA Medical Assurance 1.34% 7.05% 
APPB Applebee's Inti 1.26% 9.44% 
FBN Furniture Brands Inti 1.18% -22.85% 
RAH Ralcorp Hldgs 1.16% 4.10% 
NA First N 1.10% NA 
FHR Fairmont Hotels & Resorts 1.03% NA 
DSPG DSP Grp 1.03% 1.26% 
NA Provide 1.02% NA 
ATU Actuant A 1.02% -21.66% 
NA I shares NA NA 
SEH Spartech 0.99% -15.17% 
DSL Downey Finl 0.98% 3.30% 
NJR New Jersey Resources 0.97% 1.20% 
WCNX Waste Connections 0.93% -15.31% 
WON Westwood One 0.93% -12.39% 
HTG Heritage Ppty Invest Tr 0.92% -1.48% 
• 
SPF Standard Pacific 0.89% 4.82% 
EVG Evergreen Resources 0.88% 0.89% 
GLDB Gold Bane 0.88% 1.30% 
coo Cooper 0.88% 13.27% 
Total number of holdings 148 
%Assets in top 10 holdings 14.58 
Turnover(%) 98 
Valuation Measures: 
(Investment Valuation I Stock Portfolio category 
!Price/Book 2.33 2.37 
jPrice/Eamings 22.05 20.74 
!Price/Cash Flow 11.33 11.36 
:Price/Sales 1.8S j 
• 
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Management: 
Gatz is vice president and portfolio manager with Loomis Sayles & Company, his 
employer since 1999. Prior to joining the firm, he was a portfolio manager with Bane 
One Investment Advisers Corporation and its affiliates. He has 15 years of investment 
experience. Gatz earned his Chartered Financial Analyst designation in 1989. He 
received his BA in 1984 from Michigan State University and his MBA from Indiana 
University in 1986. 
Fees and Expenses: 
Total Expense Ratio 
Maximum Sales Fees 
Initial 
Deferred 
Redemption 
0.98% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
Maximum Other Fees 
Administrative 
Management 
12b-1 
NA 
0.75% 
0.00% 
Recommendation: Loomis Sayles is a four star fund. It has low risk and average returns. 
Their losses over the current bear market have been less than the category. Two 
weaknesses are losses in excess of the category and a higher than category average PIE 
ratio . 
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